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ABSTRACT
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT, SUPER PACS, AND
THE 2012 REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES
Nathan Katz, M.A.
Department of Sociology
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Diane M. Rodgers, Director
Super Political Action Committees (PACs) are relatively new organizations within
American politics that allow individuals to donate unlimited funds to campaign causes. This was
particularly noticeable during the 2012 Republican primary, which was one of the most wellfunded primaries in American history. One of the ways both candidates and Super PACs spend
their money is for the production of campaign ads to develop candidate images. These
advertisements contribute to a political impression management that develops candidate
performances. I have used the Symbolic Interactionist perspective for this study because the
theory states that the images or presentations of individuals are continuously being constructed,
reconstructed, and therefore dynamic. One place this can be observed is within the world of
televised political ads, where the core political images are regularly changing depending on who
is responsible for airing the advertisements as well as when and where the advertisement is aired.
By performing an ethnographic content analysis focusing on television advertisements from both
candidates and Super PACs, a typology of candidate performances was developed: the true
conservative, the working conservative, the saint, the sinner, and the traitor. Through a typology
of advertisement performances, future political advertisements, particularly television
advertisements, can be further understood by showing how particular types of advertisements
contribute to different aspects of a candidate’s impression management. My study expands upon

the literature concerning political impression management by including advertising in the era of
Super PAC political campaign finance.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The 2012 Republican primary was the first primary where Super Political Action
Committees (PACs) have been involved, making it the most well-funded political primary in
American history (Benoit and Compton 2013; Lynch 2014). As a result, between candidates and
Super PACs more money was spent on television ads than ever before1. The use of Super PACs
has the capability to change how candidates create performances and a study of these may show
how future campaigns will change their political imagery to incorporate Super PACs. PACs are
political organizations that individuals are able to anonymously donate limited amounts of
money to for the purpose of political activity. After the Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling
in 2010 Super PACs were created. Unlike traditional PACs, individuals and organizations are
able to donate an unlimited amount of money to Super PACs but lose their anonymity. Many
Super PACs are not connected to individual candidates, but candidates often have Super PACs
directly supporting them, allowing for individuals to indirectly provide candidates with unlimited
funding. While legally these organizations are independent, the links between candidates and
many of these Super PACs are fairly well known (Gulati 2012).
Super PAC funded advertisements have begun to reorganize political power and have
become an expansion of the political backstage by providing unlimited funding for the purpose
of creating public images. Impression management in television political advertisements has

This is assuming that whoever is reporting financial records is being truthful. Ron Paul’s
campaign reported spending $73,000 on media air-time but actually gave the money to an Iowa
senator Kent Sorenson to change his endorsement from candidate Michele Bachmann to Ron
Paul (Beaumont 2014).
1
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been analyzed, but research regarding Super PAC ads and how they use impression management
in television ads has not yet received the same level of analysis. Specifically, my research
investigates how impression management was used by candidates to construct their public
images in television advertisements during the 2012 Republican primaries with Super PACs
capable of supporting them. Do official campaign advertisements and their Super PAC
counterparts use the same forms of impression management to portray candidates? And how
does having a Super PAC influence a candidate’s ability to interact with the rest of the political
party? Through a Symbolic Interactionist theoretical framework I analyzed how impression
management was used on the political front stage and the implications it has for the political
backstage during the Republican 2012 primaries by conducting an ethnographic content analysis
of these political primary television advertisements.
I was able to develop five ideal type candidate performances that have been constructed
through the combined efforts of candidates and Super PACs: the true conservative, the working
conservative, the saint, the sinner, and the traitor. By developing a typology of advertisement
performances, future political advertisements, particularly television advertisements, can be
further understood by showing how particular types of advertisements contribute to different
aspects of a candidate’s impression management. My study will expand upon the literature
concerning political impression management by including advertising in the era of Super PAC
political campaign finance and how it influences the process of running for political office.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
One of the underlying premises of democratic elections is that they allow for the general
population to influence elected politicians to help them further represent the causes voters
believe are important. What political advertisements have done is just the opposite—rather than
politicians gaining support by being influenced by the electorate, politicians now focus on
shaping the opinion of the electorate to meet their needs (Banducci and Karp 2003; Harrington
1996). Most candidates do not have a completely clean slate when it comes to the general public.
Often their past political records as well as personal backgrounds can impact the voters’ view of
candidates. In order to change the view of the public, political advertisements are deployed
(Harrington 1996; Nimmo and Savage 1976).
In contemporary politics, the primary concern of voters is a politician’s image (Hall
[1979] 2005). The intense focus on political image has brought about what is often referred to as
“political theater” or “playing politics,” where partisans create a public spectacle of themselves
and their actions to create a political image and ensure victory within an election. This is often
done with political advertisements. Television advertisements are used for the purpose of
impression management through both verbal and nonverbal cues (Hall [1979] 2005). By being
surrounded with advertisements, voters have no choice but to become involved within the
political process where candidate’s images and voters intertwine to determine the future of a
democratic body (Edelman 1988; Goffman 1959).
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Potential voters become directly involved with campaigns by watching political
advertisements. Glaros and Miroff (1983) found that after watching advertisements produced by
Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign, viewers’ perceptions of Reagan and their confidence in
him as a president would change based on the themes viewers were able to identify in the
advertisements. As Glaros and Miroff (1983) explain, this is because candidates do not enter the
world of politics without voters already having opinions about their personalities and policies.
This means that television appearances and performances are used to combat preconceived
notions about a politician to varying degrees of effectiveness based on both the performances in
question and the opinions of voters prior to watching said performances.
Many times media coverage and effective advertisements become more important for
winning an election than the policies of candidates (Miller et al. 1998). The use of political
advertisements grows every year, and if a candidate is not able to produce advertisements
regularly while their opponent can, they are subsequently at an extreme disadvantage (Fridkin
and Kenney 2004; Lau et al. 2007; Devlin 1994). Although it is also the case that a poorly
constructed ad that harms one’s political campaign is counterproductive and takes away from a
politician’s resources (Devlin 1994; Fridkin and Kenney 2004; Lau et al. 2007). Through the use
of political advertisements, a campaigning politician can create an unique image of themselves
for the general public or create a particularly memorable ad (Devlin 1994). A politician can also
create a situation in which his campaign can organize future political activity as well as create a
primary focus for a campaign during the electoral process (Polsky 2012). Gaining the support of
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the general populous through mass media has become a necessity in contemporary politics in
order to win an election (Fridkin and Kenney 2004).
The tacticians behind political advertisements know very well that a certain level of
deceit and control is required in advertisement production. This is done by manipulating the
presentation of available information (Winton 2010; Edelman 2001). Information within
advertisements can be used to spread ideas throughout a democratic body in order to convince
the public to believe in ideas developed within the ads (Ellul 1965). This is important for
political advertisements as political media, particularly television coverage is the primary source
of political knowledge for many Americans (Martin 2008). Political ads further control the
political knowledge available to the public. The structure of the language used within
advertisements helps to expand upon the foundation of an advertisement (Goffman 1974). It is
also not uncommon for different political symbols and ideas to be utilized by different
individuals and organizations depending on how they wish to manage their own political
impressions (Hall 1972).
Negative Ads
Much of the past research on political advertisements has focused on their effectiveness
particularly whether positive or negative advertisements are an effective tool to win an election.
The emphasis has been on negative advertisements, which have rapidly increased in production
and are often more sensational and effective (Lau et al. 2007). Richard Lau and his colleagues
have produced two major meta-analytical studies of the impact of negative advertisements (1999;
2007). Although the first analysis was widely ignored by consultants in the eight years between
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studies, the amount of research on campaign advertisements had quadrupled (Lau et al. 2007).
Researchers have found focusing on negative ads to be highly fulfilling due to their controversial
nature. The vast majority of research has shown that people are often more influenced by
negative advertisements than from positive ones (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2010; Lau et al.
1999; Lau et al. 2007). Even after consideration for moderating factors, it has been confirmed
that negative advertisements do not decrease voter turnout, and often increase it (Lau et al. 1999;
Lau et al. 2007). Negative advertisements allow voters to identify clear differences in the
political stances of different politicians (Lau and Rovner 2009). L. Patrick Devlin (1994) found
that for a campaigning politician, negative advertisements are an effective way to gain media
attention with the potential to take the leading position within a primary. Ted Brader (2005)
expanded upon this, saying that on the emotional level negative advertisements are capable of
evoking fear within viewers to gain their support. Negative ads also have the potential to gain
attention from the free media, meaning more exposure to the population without the use of funds
(Brader 2005; Lau and Ronver 2009).
There are two basic types of attacks found in negative advertisements: those focused on
slander, often referred to as “mudslinging,” and those that criticize a politician’s failures,
hypocrisy, and incompetence, not their personal lives (Lau and Ronver 2009). Ads focusing on a
politician’s personal and professional shortcomings, while negative, are considered acceptable to
the general public and are seen as a way to hold politicians accountable (Francia and Herrnson
2007). Candidates are often hesitant to engage in mudslinging advertisements due to the
influence of their consultants. Just like the general public, politicians see these advertisements as
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foul play, and do not want to be known as mudslingers. However, politicians who hire
professional campaign managers are far more likely to engage in negative attack ads, including
those of a mudslinging nature (Francia and Hernnson 2007; Swint 2006).
Thielmen and Wilhite (1998) found that Republican candidates are often the first to
produce ads that focus on attacking their opponents. While the general public is often critical of
personal attacks within television advertisements, Republican candidates are often more open
and willing to use mudslinging in advertisements (Francia and Herrnson 2007; Lau and Ronver
2009). This may be a necessity, as in some ways Republican voters thrive on negative
advertisements. Republican voters tend to view those who use negative advertisements and their
sponsors far more positively than their Democratic counterparts (Pfau et al. 2002). According to
Martin (2004) Republican voters are also more likely to believe that political races are closer
than they appear after viewing negative advertisements.
Television Ads in the Internet Age
Television advertisements provide an opportunity for candidates to fight against what
Martin (2008) refers to as the free media: the news and journalistic coverage of political
activities during the electoral process. In contemporary elections, internet coverage can also be
considered free media. Free media is the primary way that the public gathers information making
it a powerful force capable of creating social situations (Martin 2008). While free media can be
beneficial, it is beyond the control of politicians, meaning that it may not show them in a positive
light (Steger 2000). Free media is more likely to influence the opinions of those that are more
politically involved while the politically uninformed are influenced by advertisements (Fridkin
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and Kenney 2004). Free media does not always accurately articulate the ideas and policies a
candidate wants the public to be aware of. Candidates use their own political media with this in
mind to attempt to correct what they see as the inaccuracies of the free media (Miller et al. 1998).
Free media focuses on leading candidates, meaning that those being ignored have less
access to it (Steger 2000). The longer a political primary lasts, the greater chance for a candidate
to fade into the background (Collingwood et al. 2012). In order to be introduced to the general
public, lesser-known candidates need the media exposure to be seen on a national level (Conover
and Stanley 1989). For these candidates, the ability to use television ads provides an opportunity
to gain greater exposure, momentum, and likeability to the point where they may be able to
overcome being a candidate in the background (Devlin 1994; Steger 2000). This is critical early
in the political primary process as early primary performances often help to secure resources and
the momentum necessary to endure the entire primary (Norrander 2006). At the same time, while
a strong ad may be of assistance to a politician, a poor ad may have the exact opposite effect. An
advertisement that reinforces negative aspects of a politician can worsen his political position
with no aid from the general media or their competition (Devlin 1994).
The internet is becoming more and more relevant for campaign coverage and advertising.
There are advantages to internet campaigning. It has a lower production cost (or is free), and
there is no need to pay for air-time like television ads (Sides et al. 2014). Political ads also may
have a “viral” element, where media coverage spreads to the internet for constant awareness, and
ads on the internet are already one step closer than television ads (Sides et al. 2014). Several
politicians, including Barack Obama, have attempted to harness the power of the internet and the
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ability for volunteers to become a substitute for an actual campaign staff, allowing them to make
content as a way to reduce costs, spread media information, and raise money (Poletta 2014).
However, online campaigning is somewhat unreliable. Online campaign materials can easily be
manipulated and distorted by anyone with internet access. Campaigns have less control over
content made available online, and when volunteers create media to support a candidate they do
not necessarily instill the values the candidate wants to be associated with (Sides et al. 2014;
Kreiss 2014). Despite the rise of internet media and campaigning, political issues presented on
television tend to still be the public’s primary concern (Hayes 2014; Lynch 2014). Television is
also where the majority of a campaign’s financial resources are placed, making TV ads a major
campaign investment and a significant concern for politicians (Hayes 2014).
Enter the Super PACs
The most important change introduced into the 2012 primaries was the involvement of
Super Political Action Committees (PACs). To some it was considered “The Year of the Super
PAC” (Briffault 2012; Kang 2013). This is primarily due to the large amount of money spent
during campaigning. The 2012 primary was also the first where Super PACs existed, modifying
the campaign process (Fowler and Ridout 2012). The 2012 primary was also an excellent
moment for Super PACs to begin to fully develop, as there were many candidates who had
highly constrained fundraising capabilities (Christenson and Smidt 2014). According to the
Sunlight Foundation (2012), Super PACs spent more money than most official campaigns
through the 2011-2012 election cycle (both congressional and federal). The Republican Party
spent roughly four times more money in Super PACs than the Democratic Party. Super PACs are
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a new challenge for politicians. The limitless money that Super PACs bring into campaigning
means that not only do candidates have to deal with image problems from other candidates, but
also third parties with theoretically unlimited expenditures.
Outside spending from political organizations that cannot be associated with campaigns
is nothing new. The 2004 general election brought in tremendous amounts of spending from nonassociated political organizations, and spending has only increased since (Swint 2006). Prior to
Citizens United, advertisements could be viewed in terms of first and third party ads, where the
first party are candidate sponsored ads and the third party are outside spending, Super PACs have
created “second party” advertisements. Super PACs were designed for the purpose of
independent expenditures, meaning that individuals and corporate entities could donate unlimited
funds to Super PACs. However, Super PACs could not coordinate with candidates, unlike
traditional PACs which could work with official candidates and campaigns, but had limitations
toward individual donations (Briffault 2012). This did not stop candidates from finding ways to
coordinate with Super PACs. Dino Christenson and Corwin Smidt (2014) found evidence that
the link between candidates and Super PACs may not be as clear cut, and they may in fact be
acting within the law; however the behavior of Super PACs does work with and complement the
behavior of candidates. Christenson and Smidt’s research has limitations, notably that they do
not make any distinctions between Super PACs that have known personal links to candidates,
rather they choose to not look at “Hybrid” Super PACs1 and to combine all other Super PAC
spending and look at who it supports rather than those who run the Super PACs and their
1

Hybrid Super PACs are those that have PACs cooperating with them. For example, American
Crossroads is a PAC that works directly with the Super PAC Crossroads GPS.
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personal relations to candidates. Joseph Dalia (2013) found that Super PAC advertisements were
not particularly persuasive on a national scale, but they were useful in individual situations and
for long shot candidates. However, Dalia’s research on Super PAC advertisements is lacking as
well. Dalia focused on determining if ads are positive or negative; previous research does not
consider other concerns such as if ads are image or issue ads, what topics are common in Super
PAC ads, and how impression management is utilized in Super PAC advertisements.
The use of Super PACs for advertisements rather than official campaign advertisements
is a direct modification to the flow of information made present to voters (Hall 1972). Voters are
now provided with messages from campaigns without actually being informed that the messages
are from the campaigns. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 created what is known as
Stand By Your Ad (SBYA) legislation. SBYA legislation requires ad producers to endorse the
advertisements they produce (Gale et al. 2005). This is why advertisements often end in “I am
________ and I approve this message.” In order to meet SBYA requirements a clear candidate
endorsement must be made. Because Super PACs are not officially linked to campaigns they do
not have to mention that the candidate endorses or supports an advertisement, rather they only
must reveal the organization funding the advertisements.
SBYA legislation produces trustworthiness. Ad viewers who watched several ads with
SBYA legislation were not particularly persuaded to support a candidate, but they did believe
that campaign ads with SBYA legislation were fairer than those without SBYA claims (Gale et
al. 2005). Super PACS that were indirectly linked to a campaign were able to create
advertisements semi-unified with the campaign, spreading messages without a candidate being
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accountable (Gulati 2012; Spencer and Wood 2014). This was a seemingly logical decision as
most research suggests that ad viewers tend to be more accepting of negative ads with
anonymous sponsors, rather than those with candidate SBYA support (Dowling and Wichowsky
2013; Weber et al. 2012). Ad viewers may be more comfortable when candidates make SBYA
claims, but they find the ads less convincing.
Perhaps the greatest benefit to political advertising from what at the very least appears to
be a third party, is that it can have all the effectiveness of a campaign ad, but it does not result in
the same level of political backlash, meaning candidates do not suffer from negative reception of
advertisements (Brooks and Murrov 2012). Research done on post-Citizens United advertising
does show that third party ads tend to be more negative, and that the majority of ads by Super
PACs is spent focusing on attacking candidates of the same party (Gulati 2012; Spencer and
Wood 2014; Werner and Coleman 2013; Nader 2013).

CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND METHODS
The sociological concept of impression management is one that is commonly used in
politics. Stemming from Goffman (1959), the idea of impression management is that individuals
change their behavior to alter how others see them. This is useful in political primaries due to the
reciprocal nature of impression management, where a politician will create images of
themselves, interpret voter feedback, and then modify their image accordingly to improve their
appearance among voters (Hall 1972; Nimmo and Savage 1976). Candidates take on a variety of
images to become a combination of what the voters find appealing in a political candidate and
the images that voters actually see in candidates (Nimmo 1995; Nimmo and Savage 1976). Peter
M. Hall (1972) coined the term “political impression management” to describe how Goffman’s
ideas of impression management influence political activity both in legislative and electoral
aspects. Political impression management allows for the creation of a political self—a public
identity designed for voter appeasement (Hall [1979] 2005).
The power and prestige that come with being a presidential nominee has a certain image
that goes with it (Edelman 2001; Hall [1979] 2005). Candidates must work on their image during
primaries to ensure that they “look” presidential. Because voter approval is how candidates
acquire power, they are expected to suppress their own views, in order to help create an
atmosphere that is favorable to the majority, regardless of the emotional stance of an individual
candidate (Goffman 1959). Oftentimes, politicians are seen less as people and more as a
compilation and structure of political images, values, and symbols they become associated with
(Edelman 1988; Goffman 1959). By using these images, it is possible to develop a typology of
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candidate performances, based on how the information is structured and presented. These can be
seen as Weber’s (1978) ideal and real types, as information can be categorized by how it is
presented.
When political information and ideals are compiled into a presentation, what emerges is
the “face” of a candidate. Signs are often used to create a political face. The face is the
presentation candidates use in public, as it represents the information they want to be connected
to (Goffman [1955] 1967). Through face work candidates explain why they would be ideal for
the government using a practice known as ownership, where different political parties and
candidates “own” different political issues. The issues that they own are their specialties and part
of their political identities as they become associated with political problems and potential
solutions (Hayes 2005; Petrocik et al. 2003). Ownership allows both candidates and parties to be
associated with characteristics by default. This is a form of trait ownership, the act of being
associated with values such as being fiscally responsible (Hayes 2005). Candidates can also own
political policies. In these cases political policies are “traits” of the candidates who become
known for strongly supporting and implementing political policies (Hayes 2005; Petrocik et al.
2003). By owning character traits, candidates are not only capable of presenting themselves as
experts, but also as the only ones with the most viable solution to problems they own (Edelman
1964; Petrocik et al. 2003). Candidates could be attacked based on the fact that they “own”
political policies as well.
Bill Clinton once said, “There is no point in saying what you’ve done. Keep saying what
you’re going to do, have a clear direction. Reagan and Thatcher did that, and they didn’t have to
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achieve that much” (Cronin 2008:3). The truth in Clinton’s claims can be seen through Hall’s
(1972; [1979] 2005) works on politics and impression management. According to Hall (1972),
past research revealed that American voters pay more attention to political images than actual
policy. While voters are often frustrated with candidates’ emphasis on image rather than policy,
they are the ones who provide more substantial rewards for having quality political performances
rather than quality policies (Cronin 2008). Political actors respond to the public’s behavior that
favors acting through the use of language and images to create desirable social situations with
the hope that the public will respond in a positive manner (Hall [1979] 2005). Hall ([1979] 2005)
makes note of the fact impression management is not just verbal but is also visual. Political
advertisements are one of the many ways that impression management can take form through the
use of visual imagery. These cultural symbols are utilized in television and other forms of mass
media, where a politician can project the desired images throughout households wherever
potential voters are.
Both Goffman (1963) and Edelman (1964) deal with the concept of symbols. Goffman
developed the concept of prestigious and stigmatic symbols. Prestigious symbols are those that
emphasize the strengths of an individual, what makes them noteworthy to others and why they
may be significant. Stigmatic symbols on the other hand show aspects of individuals that are
undesirable (Goffman 1963). The idea of using symbols is to show that candidates are “with”
someone or something (Goffman 1963). Prestigious symbols show candidates “with” successful
businesses, famous political figures, or others of exemplary character. Stigmatic symbols would
show candidates “with” inconsistency, weakness, and the discredited. Edelman (1964) builds on
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the concept of being “with” someone in politics through what he calls referential symbols.
Referential symbols are those that show a politician’s direct physical or character based
reference. Referential symbols not only refer to other people, but also to political ideas showing
how similar two different candidates, policies, or ideas are (Edelman 1964). Edelman (1964) also
developed the idea of condensation symbols. Condensation symbols are those that are purely
emotive and use emotional triggers to pull at the heartstrings of viewers in order to ensure
reactions based on ideas such as sympathy, rage, and fear (Edelman 1964).
The purpose of using political signs and symbols is to make sure that individuals respond
in a desirable manner (Edelman 1964). In the case of political primaries, those individuals are
not only the voters but also the competing candidates. In some cases, stigmas become visible,
and simply by presenting oneself in public, viewers think about the stigmatic elements of a
character (Goffman 1963). Political stigmas may hurt one’s chance of receiving votes or even
respect. Placing stigmas on political figures is an effective and useful strategy for candidates to
manage the competition. The political signs used show the values of the political community
(Edelman 1964). For political primaries, this means that the signs produced in advertisements
show the values of the primary runner, and with whom these values are to be associated with.
The Front and Backstage
Impression management deals with the idea of both a front and a backstage. The front
stage is what the public sees, and the backstage is hidden from the general population (Goffman
1959). In politics, the backstage consists primarily of the activities designed in order to gain
support from the voting population (Hall 1972). The political backstage is also a place of back
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room deals and planning away from the scrutiny of the public; the same application of theoretical
concepts can include televised political advertisements (Hall 1972; Hall [1979] 2008; Davis
2000). Through advertisements candidates create frames for their campaigns, allowing them to
organize for future political activity, the desired faces of candidates, and decide on major focuses
for a campaign. This is planned and calculated on the political backstage, where the public
remains unaware of the direct intentions of ad creators and political strategists (Polsky 2012;
Hall 1972).
By standing out as someone willing to protest against a popular establishment or with a
creative advertisement used to build character, a politician can develop likeability within the
population (Pfau et al. 2002). Political actors use impression management to put the public into a
state of suspended disbelief, where no political reality exists beyond that framed within
advertisements (Cronin 2008). The use of a suspended disbelief is the test of impression
management. If a candidate’s impressions go over well with the audience, then they have
convinced the audience they are portraying the situation accurately (Gardner and Martinko
1988). If an actor is not accurately portraying a situation, they will return to the backstage to
modify their presentations and represent them to the public creating a “feedback loop” where the
audience and the actors become involved with each other (Gardner and Martinko 1988).
For actors, the front stage is highly ritualized. These practices and manners are established so
performers know how to act and audience members know what to expect when viewing front
stage activity (Goffman 1959). Rituals are necessary as they make political processes effective
because all participants are expected to take part in rituals (Edelman 1964). The historical use of
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political rituals creates circumstances that are beyond the control of a candidate (Hall 1997). If
television is a political front stage then it means that politicians are expected to engage in the
practice of creating political advertisements when they decide to run for office. There are also
standard behaviors and practices for candidates regarding the content of political advertisements.
The requirement for advertisements to meet Stand By Your Ad (SBYA) regulations is an
example of established and ritualized practices and circumstances beyond the control of a
candidate. Candidates are expected to engage in SBYA statements to show the public who is
behind the advertisements. Super Political Action Committee (PAC) advertisements do engage in
SBYA claims but do not have to reveal their purpose as being solely for directly supporting
candidates, creating a loophole for candidates associated with the political front stage. Super
PACs let candidates cheat the audience through performances that are not simply misleading, but
also misrepresenting the performers as well.
Despite being locked into a political situation, it does not necessarily mean that
performers are in a harmful position (Kanter 1972). Political ads are useful to candidates, so even
if they were not compelled to produce ads they would most likely pursue ad production anyway.
Appearances on the front stage also show that an idea or image is worthy of public attention, so a
candidate who does not or cannot produce television advertisements may not be considered
worthwhile by viewers (Altheide 1985).
On the political front stage, various aspects of Goffman’s concepts of impression
management are seen. It is here where candidates present their political faces to the public
alongside the faces developed by the public through acts such as passing, covering, and
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discrediting. Passing is the practice of disregarding negative attributes in order to place more
emphasis on the positive ones, while covering allows candidates to hide their negative traits
(Goffman 1963). The act of discrediting allows candidates to apply blemishes, pieces of negative
information to other candidates to hope that they can stigmatize them (Goffman 1963).
Traditionally, the front stage and the backstage are kept separate (Goffman 1959). In
politics the secrets of the backstage are critical. Deals are often seen as being made in “smoke
filled rooms” by political elites uninterrupted from the public, whether they be in the public’s
general interest or otherwise (Davis 2000). The backstage is also where candidates coordinate
with their service specialists in order to manage political impressions, and to take in public
feedback so candidates can continue to modify their impressions as desired (Gardner and
Martinko 1988; Goffman 1959). It is the backstage where candidates decide what information to
pass, what to cover, and what is used to discredit others. There are two reasons that the stages are
kept separate. The first reason is that what happens on the backstage is hidden from the public,
and historically it has been unrecorded, making it hard to show the public without any physical
representation (Davis 1980; Goffman 1959).
The second reason the backstage is hidden is far more critical. The backstage is often
suspicious, corrupt, borderline illegal, and is known for hiding secrets designed to produce
results favorable to those who occupy it (Goffman 1959). The backstage is not only used for
policy deals, but also for strategic developments toward impression management that candidates
may wish to keep secret (Goffman 1959; Hall 1972). The American public often sees politics in
the form of actors rather than power structures so when the backstage is revealed it is not the
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political system that becomes critiqued but the politicians involved (Hall 1972). As the backstage
is revealed, it is not the political process that suffers these consequences but instead the actors
involved. By sharing the backstage performers are engaging in similar behavior and have a
collective interest in keeping viewers away (Kanter 1972). When public viewers have access to
the backstage, it makes it harder for those who regularly occupy it to perform backstage activities
(Hall 1972). Political attack advertisements often expose the backstage and share secretive
information with the hope of eliminating a candidate’s credibility (Goffman 1963; Hall 1972).
Super PACS are a new edition to the backstage. Richard Kang (2013:1919) makes note
of the fact that individual campaigns had Super PACs that served as “alter egos” to candidates.
These alter egos are “candidate specific Super PACs,” Super PACs designed for the sole purpose
of advancing a single candidate rather than the political party as a whole, or associated with a
particular political policy (Briffault 2012:1675). The alter egos consist of second party
advertisement creators: Super PACs linked to candidates but not actually managed by them.
Through these second party Super PACS, candidates could take advantage of the newly available
unlimited funding and make political statements without claiming responsibility.
While on the surface, no Super PAC is directly linked to a candidate or campaign,
political analysts can determine that some Super PACs are in fact linked to candidates (Gulati
2012; Ceaser et al. 2013). These unofficial branches of political campaigns were often run by
former members of a campaign’s staff who were closely trusted by candidates (Gulati 2012).
Super PAC ads could not have candidates speaking for themselves making personal issues
statements, but they were able to use pre-recorded material available to the public (Ceaser et al.
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2013). Candidates would continuously blur the line between what was and was not independent
of their campaigns. Primary runner Jon Huntsman officially endorsed a Super PAC known as
Our Destiny, whose primary donor was Huntsman’s own father. Mitt Romney openly advocated
for people to donate to the Super PAC Restore Our Future that was established by former
Romney staffers (Gulati 2012; McIntire and Luo 2012). Another common tactic was for political
campaigns and Super PACs to hire the same advertising firm for campaign ads. This way,
advertisers could communicate and work together, but legally there was no coordination between
campaigns and Super PACs (Kang 2013).
Political Mythmaking
Goffman’s (1959) concept of mystification has components of political mythmaking.
Myths are created for the purpose of creating false ideas about actors and situations, in order to
distract audiences from the reality of the situation (Ellul 1965). Mystification consists of
constructed performances rather than spontaneous ones (Goffman 1959). Political mythmaking is
the art of creating ideals and images about a candidate or nation that are entirely fictional. They
become legends in themselves due to the public’s aspiration for such realities to be true. In
political advertisements, myths take performances to the next level of dramatization. When
mythmaking and mystification becomes involved, one is not simply a “conservative,” they are
“the most conservative candidate since Ronald Reagan.”
Myths hold a quasi-religious status in public viewing. The myths are “sacred” texts,
images and information that must go unaltered in order to preserve the situation (Altheide and
Johnson 1980). To an extent, all advertisements have some mythmaking involved.
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Advertisements show the best of the candidate campaigning and the worst of their opponents, but
some advertisements and candidates take the ideals and concepts of the myth to whole new
levels. These myths consume social situations and information, encouraging individuals to
believe in highly distorted or false situations, and information based on a belief held by the
general public (Ellul 1965). Individuals become attached to these myths, and to speak against
them becomes borderline heretical (Ellul 1965). Oftentimes myths are unbreakable, and no
matter how much evidence is shown to the contrary, nothing will convince one who believes in a
political myth that any other reality can possibly be true (Edelman 1988). The American Dream
is one of these myths (Edelman 1964; Ellul 1965). A house, car, 2.5 children, and a white picket
fence may be overly idealistic about what it means to be successful in America but is a well
known myth. The goal of obtaining the American Dream is a mystification of contemporary
economic struggles that emphasizes the wishes of individuals rather than their actual living
situations. The concept of “American Values” is also a myth. There is no common set of values
that belong to all American citizens. When asked what “American Values” truly consist of, no
one can find a concrete answer (Hall and Hewitt 1970). Yet the ideas of the American Dream
and American Values make excellent political rhetoric, which is able to reach the hearts of
individual voters, calling for voters to endorse candidates who advocate for these sociopolitical
fantasies.
Myths are not only for the audience: actors are suspect to myths as well, particularly
those regarding the importance of politicians and their ability to influence the public (Ellul 1965;
Edelman 1964). There are also myths shared by both candidates and voters, and when myths are
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shared by both candidates and the audience, candidates often use political myths in order to
advance their own careers (Edelman 1988). The most notable shared myth is that of the political
hero (Nimmo and Savage 1976).
The hero is an individual that Goffman (1959) would refer to as “exalted.” These figures
hold qualities superior to that of their peers, the mythical component of the perfect candidate,
who emphasizes all that a political party stands for, gets desired results, and either keeps a nation
as it is or changes it for the better. The political hero is a private myth, which each individual
separately believes in, making it stronger and more personal (Ellul 1965). This is the problem
with attempting to claim to be the political hero. Every individual has their own perception of
what the political hero needs to do (Nimmo and Savage 1976).
Ronald Reagan may be considered an attempt to create the “political hero,” and is
perhaps the most well known Republican to become exalted. He is praised by conservatives as
being the most important and positively influential president in recent history. Reagan is credited
with having a calm and connecting personal manner, and a profound understanding of the
necessity of political performances, which is part of what helped him become the myth that he is
today (Cronin 2008). However, in order to ensure Reagan’s mythical status, he needed to be
separated from his political record, which is not particularly conservative1. Reagan’s record
contradicts what the legend of Reagan represents, and to become the cultural hero he is today,
severing all ties to his legislative history was necessary.

1

Reagan’s dealings with the Iran Contra, continuous raising of taxes, use of executive orders, amnesty for
immigrants, the massive debt increase during his administration, his contribution to establishing the National
Security Agency, and promoting an assault weapons ban are hardly what a contemporary conservative would find
“ideal” (Busby 2011; Edelman 1988; Goodman 2014; Mehrota 2013; NPR Staff 2010; Ungar 2014).

24
Frames, Encounters, and Performances
The creation and use of television ads can serve as a strip of framework, creating a small
series of events and experiences. These events maintain cues to let the audience know when a
series of events begins and ends (Goffman 1974). In political advertising this would be the
duration of a television commercial, where a viewer would be informed they were to begin
engagement in a political situation as an advertisement began, and would cease to be involved in
politics as the advertisement came to an end. Political advertisements would be within a
ceremonial framework, as there is no “playful deceit” involved (Goffman 1974). If there was
playful deceit involved in political advertisements it would detract from their general purpose,
meaning the advertisements would be more for the entertainment of campaign strategists and
candidates than being a framework focused first and foremost with ensuring a desirable voter
outcome. Goffman’s (1974) idea of a “corrective hoax” framework, where individuals and
groups use impression management to change the opinions of viewers, is also applicable to
politics. While corrective hoaxes are often more casual and for the sake of amusement, both
political advertisements and corrective hoaxes work to engage large audiences in order to ensure
they believe a desired social situation.
Performances consist of a series of encounters, each providing their own particular
contributions (Goffman 1959). In the world of political advertising, each advertisement can be
considered an encounter with the public; if each advertisement is an encounter, then the overall
performance is that which takes the messages, images, and interactions accumulated from all the
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television ads in a single campaign season. Candidates use political advertisements to create
performances with the hope of designing a convincing front stage in politics.
Television advertisements can be used for political framing to help to expand and solidify
the transference of power by persuading voters to accept the reality desired by candidates (Hall
[1979] 2005; Weber [1919] 2008). Advertisements are a direct attempt to actively portray
politicians in a particular manner; they are planned and timed appearances in the political world
where ad creators have absolute control over images projected (Hall 1972). These advertisements
are used for the purpose of impression management through both verbal and nonverbal cues
(Hall [1979] 2005; Goffman 1959). Because Super PACs are now involved in the campaign
process, more advertisements will result in more frequent framing and reframing of candidate
images.
Methods
Advertisements can be seen as cultural artifacts left behind that reflect the political
culture at the time of their creation. As cultural artifacts, they can be analyzed to reveal the ideas
of their creators. In order to successfully perform an ethnographic content analysis of television
ads I developed a dataset from the larger Stanford Political Communications Lab (PCL)
database. Ads taken from the PCL database were those created by candidates and from Super
PACs with known links toward candidates (Gulati 2012). This allows analysis to be focused on
the influence that Super PACs have on campaigns. This is a new opportunity for campaigns to
create political ads with minimal, or possibly no, accountability. While other Super PACs were
involved in the 2012 Republican Primary, these Super PACs were often of a different nature.
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The Super PACs chosen were not only designated to support the campaign platforms of single
candidates, but they were also the Super PACs that raised the most money to specifically support
each candidate (Opensecrets.org n.d.a). “Third Party” Super PACs that created advertisements as
well were completely outside the control of candidates and many spent money on political races
aside from that of the presidential primary. Furthermore, outside spending for campaigns existed,
through PACs, before Citizens United, but it is only now that candidates themselves also have
potentially unlimited spending. These Super PACs, while capable of creating their own
problems, deserve a separate analysis because they are completely beyond the control of
candidates, while candidates are capable of having some influence in the Super PACs analyzed.
English ads were taken from the database and cross referenced with the P2012: Race for
the Whitehouse website in order to filter out internet advertisements and discover the original
region that advertisements aired. Upon cross referencing, it was discovered that the PCL
database was incomplete. The PCL database did not include three advertisements: two from
Revolution PAC, one from Keep Conservatives United, and one sponsored by the Herman Cain
campaign. These ads were found online and added to the general advertisement list. Lastly four
ads that were attributed to candidates were actually produced by their Super PACs. Three ads by
The Red, White, and Blue Fund were attributed to Rick Santorum rather than his Super PAC,
and one advertisement from Restore Our Future was attributed to Mitt Romney. RevPAC’s ad
“Adherence to Oath,” while aired on the internet was designed for television, so it was included
in the database. After adding the additional ads, a total of 76 official campaign ads and 57 Super
PAC ads were compiled. Simple random sampling was used to compile a list of 70 ads to be
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analyzed; 40 from candidates and 30 from Super PACs which can be seen in Appendixes B and
C.
Ads were coded into four categories by region based on how the National Census divides
the nation: Northeast, West, Midwest, and South. Ads that were known to be televised, but did
not have region information available, and the Revolution PAC ad that was designed for
television but did not have enough funding to be aired, “Adherence to Oath” were coded as
having no region available.
The coding guide (Appendix A) stems from Kaid and Johnston’s (2001) Videostyle
codex, though some changes were necessary. The most distinct modifications of the Videostyle
codex were the exclusion of questions regarding the use of music and video production
techniques. Because primary advertisements may attack the president, opponents, or both the
questions regarding political attacks need to be asked twice to help determine if there is any
significant difference in who is attacked more often and if there is a difference in how President
Obama or other primary politicians are approached. Additionally, questions regarding religion
and religious affiliation as well as specifically looking for associations with the Tea Party, have
been included. A major criticism of Videostyle is that it often sees ads solely in terms of positive
or negative advertising. Positive advertisements are those that portray the strengths and positive
aspects of a candidate, while negative advertisements focus on failing social policies or
unfavorable aspects of opponents is also incredibly common for advertisements to have a
combination of positive and negative messages rather than simply having “positive” and
“negative” ads or “image” and “issue” ads (Johnston and Kaid 2002). In order to compensate for
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this deficiency there will be four possibilities for coding rather than simply two. Ads can either
be positive advertisements, negative advertisements, positive advertisements with negative
messages, or negative ads with positive messages. If there is a mixture of positive and negative
messages, the dominant classification will be determined by how much time is spent on each
aspect of an advertisement, meaning that if an ad is 30 seconds long, and 16 seconds are devoted
to positive images and 14 seconds are devoted to negative messages, then the advertisement will
be classified as a positive advertisement with negative messages.
As Altheide and Schneider (2013) explain, numeric coding is not enough to fully
understand media analysis. Some emotive and visual aspects can only be fully understood
through observing videos. For this reason, additional notes, comments, and remarks about
advertisements and what they made the coders feel was also recorded and taken into
consideration (Altheide and Schneider 2013). By combining qualitative numeric coding and
open coding through observation it was possible to encompass more aspects of the
advertisements in question. After going through all the advertisements viewed, they were
“looped” through a second time. Each advertisement was given a second viewing to ensure that
no concept developed later in the first viewing was ignored in earlier ads. Twenty percent of
advertisements, which can be found in Appendix D, were also coded by a fellow graduate
student for the sake of intercoder reliability. There was a 91% level of intercoder reliability.

CHAPTER 4: THE PLAYERS
Meet The Candidates and Their Super PACs
The 2012 Republican Primary had eight noteworthy candidates within it: Jon Huntsman,
Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry, Herman Cain, Ron Paul, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, and
Mitt Romney. Each candidate produced a distinct number of political advertisements and many
faced unique media challenges. Each candidate also gathered funds for both their official
campaign and the unofficial campaign expansions based in the form of Super Political Action
Committees (PACs). This section focuses on major candidates who also produced
advertisements that were analyzed, and can be summarized in Table 1, which shows which
candidate was associated with what Super PAC and how much money both the candidate and the
Super PAC were able to raise during the primary season. Four other candidates ran in the
primary: Buddy Roemer, Gary Johnson, Fred Karger, and Tim Pawlenty. Roemer and Johnson
produced no advertisements. Roemer would go on to seek nomination through the Reform Party,
while Gary Johnson became the Libertarian Party nominee (Burns 2012; Libertarian Party 2012).
Karger and Pawlenty did produce advertisements but did not have a Super PAC to support them
(Derrick 2012). Because of this their ads were excluded. Without a Super PAC, they would not
have been able to engage in the new expansions of the political backstage. Media analysts and
political insiders expected Pawlenty to be a noteworthy candidate. Unfortunately for Pawlenty,
that was not the case. Pawlenty’s campaign had a failure to initially launch and gain any
momentum. This was often attributed to the fact that Pawlenty himself was painfully bland
(Coombs 2013).
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Table 1. Candidates, Super PACs and Funding
Candidate
Huntsman
Bachmann
Perry
Cain
Gingrich
Paul
Santorum
Romney

Money Raised
7,835,277
9,244,228
19,704,706
16,672,939
23,131,262
40,627,094
22,358,245
97,963,836

Super PAC
Our Destiny
Keep Conservative United
Make Us Great Again
9-9-9 Fund
Winning Our Future
Revolution PAC
Red, White, and Blue Fund
Restore Our Future

Money Raised
3,195,677
27,187
5,607,881
617,670
23,907,955
1,251,849
8,517,926
61,472,694

Jon Huntsman
Former governor and ambassador to China, Jon Huntsman Jr. announced his campaign on
June 12th 2011 in an interview on Bloomberg News (Bloomberg TV 2011). Huntsman is the only
candidate analyzed to never take the lead in the 2012 primary. Hoping to have an appeal to
independent voters as well as traditional Republicans, resulted in him being labeled as a political
moderate, which was the source of a great deal of scrutiny (Coombs 2013). Despite claiming to
oppose the use of personal funds for a political campaign, Huntsman ended up using his own
money to attempt to get his campaign off the ground (Coombs 2013). Mid-January Huntsman
ended his campaign to become the presidential nominee (Rutenberg and Zeleny 2012).
Huntsman’s personal campaign would spend a total of 7.8 million dollars (Gulati 2012). The
Huntsman campaign produced two television ads.
Our Destiny was the Super PAC supporting Jon Huntsman. Our Destiny was managed by
a former lobbyist and official for the Huntsman campaign named Tom Loeffler (Mehta 2012b).
The Super PAC would raise 3.2 million dollars. The primary donor to Our Destiny was Jon
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Huntsman’s father, Jon Huntsman Sr., who donated a total of $2,219,039 (Opensecrets.org n.d.a;
Opensecrets.org n.d.e). Our Destiny produced three ads.
Michele Bachmann
In an attempt to compare herself to Margaret Thatcher, America’s self-described “Iron
Lady” Michele Bachmann was a congresswoman known for her media exposure and charisma.
What she was not known for was producing any major legislation of historical significance or
with major lasting impact (Coombs 2013). On July 27th 2011, Bachmann announced she would
be running as a Tea Party Conservative (Condon 2011). Bachmann was prone to political gaffes
and making blatantly false claims but managed to take the lead in the primaries quickly. She
came in first place during the Ames Straw Poll (though it is important to note that neither Jon
Huntsman nor Mitt Romney chose to participate). The earliest polls in July also showed that she
was the party favorite early on (Jensen 2011a; Coombs 2013). Bachmann ended her campaign
on January 4th 2012 choosing to endorse Mitt Romney as she left, but before that she was able to
raise just over 9 million dollars for her campaign (Acosta et al. 2012; CNN Wire Staff 2012;
Gulati 2012). Bachmann’s campaign produced a total of six television ads.
Perhaps holding the weakest link between candidate and Super PAC, Bachmann was
supported by Keep Conservatives United, an organization that decided it would spend its time
focusing on Rick Perry (Schwartz 2011). This did not stop Bachmann from openly endorsing the
organization (Gulati 2012). Keep Conservatives United was founded by Bob Harris, and would
eventually spend $27,000, making it one of the less lucrative Super PACs (Confessore 2011;
Gulati 2012). Keep Conservatives United created one television advertisement for Bachmann.
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Rick Perry
Announcing his candidacy on the same day as the Ames Straw Poll allowed Rick Perry,
the longest serving governor of Texas, who had never lost an election, to eclipse the attention
that Michele Bachmann was receiving (Coombs 2013; Ceaser et al. 2013). Bachmann would
eventually retaliate by criticizing Perry for mandating that girls get HPV vaccinations while
Merck, the producer of Gardasil was a major campaign donor for Perry, and his campaign
manager used to be part of the pharmaceutical industry (Coombs 2013). As Bachmann began to
decline in popularity, Perry took her place holding the lead in July and September of 2011
(Jensen 2011c; Jones 2011). Despite criticisms, for a short time Perry was considered a candidate
that had major appeal to all political groups. There was a point in October where Perry was able
to out-fund Romney, and Perry would raise just under eight million dollars (Coombs 2013;
Gulati 2012). Unfortunately for Perry, the more he spoke the less popular he would become
(Coombs 2013). In a November debate, Perry had his “oops” moment. Perry planned on
explaining a policy that would cut three government agencies but forgot what the third one was
(Terkel 2011). In January 2012 Perry would withdraw from the political race and endorse
Gingrich, only to later endorse Romney instead (Sink 2012). During his campaign, Perry created
15 advertisements and raised 19 million dollars (Gulati 2012).
Make Us Great Again was a Super PAC founded by Mike Toomy, the former chief of
staff to the Perry campaign (Mehta 2012a). Make Us Great Again would raise 5.6 million dollars
in total, with the most notable funder being the Contran Corporation (Opensecrets.org n.d.c;
Opensecrets.org n.d.d). Make us Great Again produced six advertisements.
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Herman Cain
Herman Cain had a waning amount of fame within the Republican Party due to his vocal
opposition of health care reform in the 1990s (Ceaser et al. 2013). Cain was the only running
candidate to have never served political office, though he was the chief lobbyist for the National
Restaurant Association. He was also the only African American candidate to run in the primary
as well. This not only gave him the opportunity to run as a political outsider, but also gave him
the ability to talk about race in the Republican primary (Coombs 2013). Entering the race early
on, Cain was able to take the lead from Perry in September. One of Cain’s biggest struggles was
the lack of successful fundraising; he eventually raised a total of 16.67 million dollars (Bacon
2011; Ceaser et al. 2013; Gulati 2012). A series of sex scandals and criticism for attempting to
sell a book (about how he won the 2012 election) as he campaigned would be his downfall. Cain
would retire from the race in December of 2011 (Streitfield 2011). As 2012 emerged, he would
endorse Newt Gingrich and then later Mitt Romney (Boerma 2012). The Cain campaign
produced two televised advertisements.
The 9-9-9 Fund was a Super PAC created to support Cain and named after his economic
policy (nine percent income tax, nine percent sales tax, nine percent tax on business transactions)
and would raise a total of $617,000 (Gulati 2012). The largest donor was Richard Stoker who
donated a total of $5,000 (Opensecrets.org n.d.b). The 9-9-9 Fund would create one televised
advertisement. After Cain’s campaign ended, the remaining finances of The 9-9-9 fund would be
transferred to The Cain Connections Super PAC; a Super PAC created by Cain after he left the
election designed for his own political activism (Abowd 2012a).
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Newt Gingrich
After Cain lost his favorability, Gingrich would receive a spike in popularity, taking the
lead in November (Steinhauser 2011a; Steinhauser 2011b). In late December, Ron Paul briefly
took the lead, followed by Romney, but by January, Gingrich, who had suffered a dip in
popularity, regained the lead (Coombs 2013; Des Moines Register 2012; Jensen 2011b). Former
Speaker of the House and “idea man” Newt Gingrich produced 15 advertisements during the
course of his campaign. During his campaign, Gingrich’s greatest strength was also his biggest
weakness. Gingrich had a great deal of success in the 1990s, with solving unemployment issues
and allowing the Republicans to retake the House of Representatives (Ceaser et al. 2013).
However, the height of his career came to a swift end due to corruption charges (Coombs 2013).
Gingrich was often criticized for initially running a campaign without showing any interest in
being president (Coombs 2013; Pitney 2011). Gingrich was able to raise a total of 23 million
dollars, his campaign ended on May 2nd 2012 (Gulati, 2012; Dover 2012).
Winning Our Future was a Super PAC designed to help endorse Gingrich that raised just
under 23 million dollars. Becky Burkett ran the Super PAC after working for other media and
lobbying organizations created and run by Gingrich (Opensecrets.org n.d.k). The Super PAC was
primarily funded by Gingrich’s friend Sheldon Aidelson, a multi-millionaire who made his
money in the casino industry (Confessore and Lipton 2012). Both Aidelson and his wife donated
7.5 million dollars to Winning Our Future (Duszak 2013). Winning Our Future released 14 ads
on television.
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Ron Paul
Jacques Ellul (1965:69) described “the agitator” as, “[one who] functions as a nationalist.
He does not appeal to a doctrine or principle, nor does he propose specific reforms…Usually he
is against the New Deal and for laissez-faire liberalism: against plutocrats, internationalists, and
socialists—bankers and Communists alike…The agitator is especially active in the most
unorganized groups of the United States. He uses the anxiety psychoses of the lower middle
class, the neo-proletarian, the immigrant, the demobilized soldier …The agitator uses the
American Way of Life to provoke anti-Semitic, anti-Communist, anti-Negro, and xenophobic
current of opinion.” This is the essence of Ron Paul and his ideology. Ron Paul’s ultra-libertarian
and isolationist stances brought in support from white supremacists, while at the same time
rarely receiving serious attention from public media. This does not mean he was without a series
of loyal followers who performed a “moneybomb” for the campaign and raised 1 million dollars
in small donations in a single day (Coombs 2013). In 2012 Ron Paul began his third attempt to
run for president (Ceaser et al. 2013). While Paul did not receive a great deal of success in many
national polls, he was the winner of the Conservative Political Action Conference poll and a poll
held by the Family Research Council (Coombs 2013). For a week in December he was the leader
in the polls, but quickly was replaced by Romney (Des Moines Register 2012; Jensen 2011b).
Ron Paul’s campaign raised 41 million dollars produced 16 advertisements, and never actually
ended (Opensecrets.org n.d.j). Paul ran until the very end, but failed to receive enough delegates
to win the nomination.
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Ron Paul was supported by Revolution PAC (RevPAC). One of Revolution PAC’s
advisory board members was Penny Langford Freeman who used to serve as Ron Paul’s political
director (Abowd 2012b). RevPAC claimed that Ron Paul served as the “third option” and was an
alternate to mainstream politics as it raised a total of 1.25 million dollars (Abowd 2012b;
Opensecrets.org n.d.h). Of the 1.25 million dollars, RevPAC spent the majority on noncampaign related activities (Webster 2012). RevPAC created two televised advertisements.
RevPAC pushed for advertisements in a peculiar way. Both RevPAC televised advertisements
were originally put on YouTube with requests for donations in order raise enough money to have
them aired on television (TheRevolutionPAC 2011; TheRevolutionPAC 2012). One ad was
successfully aired, but the other was not. However, because the ad that did not air on television
(Adherence to Oath) was designed with the intention of being placed on television, it was
included in the database.
Rick Santorum
Rick Santorum was a two-term senator and came in second during the presidential
primary process. In February, Santorum would take the lead in the 2012 Primary (CBS News
2012). Known for being socially conservative, Santorum was proudly pro-life, anti-college, antigay rights, and claimed to be the most pro-family candidate (Coombs 2013). Santorum had a
somewhat mixed public reception. He was well known for fighting against health care reform
and winning over politically liberal regions of Pennsylvania, but he was also considered by many
to be too conservative to win in a general election (Ceaser et al. 2013; Balz 2012). Santorum’s
campaign produced a total of 11 television ads before leaving the primary race. He would then
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proceed to endorse Romney a month later (Haberman 2012). Santorum has a long history of
being associated with corporate lobbyists. When he left Congress an email between lobbyists
said that his leaving, “create[d] a big hole we need to fill” (Bimbaum 2006). His corporate ties
may have helped him raise 22 million dollars (Opensecrets.org n.d.i).
The Red, White, and Blue fund was the Super PAC behind Rick Santorum. This Super
PAC raised a total of 8.5 million dollars, including two individuals that donated 1 million dollars
each (Opensecrets.org n.d.f; Opensecrets.org n.d.g). With the money raised, The Red, White, and
Blue fund aired 11 advertisements on television. The Red, White, and Blue fund was founded by
Nick Ryan, a former campaign advisor to Rick Santorum (Marcus 2012a).
Mitt Romney
Willard “Mitt” Romney eventually won the Republican presidential primary. Many
expected Romney to win from the beginning. After placing second in the 2008 Republican
Primary, he was considered “next in line” for the Republican candidacy, particularly by the
political elites with heavy corporate ties who have traditionally dominated the Republican Party
(Ceaser 2013). But the ex-governor of Massachusetts went through a long battle to win the
nomination, in part due to the rise of social conservatives and the Tea Party who were less
concerned with corporate ties and were seemingly more concerned with social issues (Ceaser et
al. 2013). Romney was faced with accusations of being uninteresting, too moderate, inconsistent,
and was criticized for once writing an article titled “Let Detroit Go Bankrupt” (Coombs 2013). In
order to secure his election, Romney had to downplay his own political record, which had some
liberal tendencies, in order to meet the appeals of the far-right voting block in the Republican
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Party (Jacobson 2013). At the same time, he was also the only governor running with name
recognition, and he was a favorite among party insiders. With his wealth, name recognition, and
insider favorability, Romney was able to raise just under 100 million dollars during the primary
process (Gulati 2012). Romney created 14 political ads.
Restore Our Future was a Super PAC designed to support Mitt Romney. It created 18
television ads. It was founded by Carl Forti and Larry McCarthy. Forti was the director of
Romney’s 2008 presidential campaign, and McCarthy was the head of the 2008 campaign’s
media team. Charles Spies was the Super PAC’s treasurer and was a financial advisor to Mitt
Romney during the 2008 campaign (Marcus 2012b). Restore Our Future raised over 61 million
dollars during the primary campaign (New York Times n.d.).

CHAPTER 5: CANDIDATE PERFORMANCE TYPES
The 2012 Republican Primary included countless advertisements that contributed toward
the development of a typology of candidate images. By breaking down candidate images into
broader performances, broader, more ideological symbols and ideas can be expressed by
candidates. These broad sets of images can then be “brought to life” through the analysis of an
ongoing discourse as revealed by the timeline section, which shows how candidate and Super
Political Action Committee (PAC) ads worked together to shape more specific images at
different points within a political campaign, while reflecting on how different candidates
responded to the images put out by their opponents earlier in race.
During the analysis of the 2012 primary, I was able to develop five ideal performances
within the television advertisements: The true conservative, the working conservative, the saint,
the sinner, and the traitor. As “ideal type” performances, they serve as larger templates for how
political information is arranged in order to show candidates in a desirable manner. Information
was arranged through emphasizing a candidate’s prestige, discrediting, passing, and covering; all
of which are concepts developed by Goffman. Often candidates engage in multiple performance
types, particularly the negative performances of the sinner and the traitor against their will. As a
result, on the campaign trail, different political encounters would often emphasize different
aspects of political information so that candidates could express different aspects of
performances. Candidates could also engage in multiple performance types at once, particularly
when they were beneficial and complimented each other.
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Being Conservative: The One True Value
The most important, overarching aspect of political performances during the 2012
primary was the need to have the face of a conservative. Rick Santorum’s campaign
advertisement “Best Chance” claimed he was a “full-spectrum” conservative and mapped out
why:
Male Voiceover: Rick Santorum is rock solid on values issues, a Tea Party
favorite for fighting corruption and tax payer abuse, more foreign policy
credentials than any candidate, and Rick’s Made in the U.S.A. plan will make
America an economic superpower again. Rick Santorum: A trusted conservative
who gives us the best chance to take back America.
By making a claim to be conservative, candidates were making an appeal to the concept of the
in-group. Claiming to be a conservative candidate meant that one naturally belonged within the
in-group, and therefore they should be elected to lead (Goffman 1963). In the 2012 primary to
“naturally belong” to the Republican Party meant to be either a true or working conservative.
The need for a conservative was in part for the purpose of “taking back America.”
“Taking the country back” to “restore America” is directly opposing political change, out of a
fear that one might lose power. The overly-white base of the Republican Party may have seen
change in multiculturalism and diversity that would inevitably lead to a different America where
they would have less political power (Edelman 2001). But taking the country back and restoring
conservatism was also an internal problem. The Republican Party was slowly beginning to
acknowledge that its own past record was not particularly conservative, and that the party itself
needed to reinstate its own conservative values (Neville-Shepard and Theye 2013). Part of taking
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the country back for conservatives also meant ensuring a truly conservative candidate was
nominated.
There were two main performances regarding political conservatism. Candidates would
take on the face of the true conservative and the working conservative. The true conservative was
ideologically pure one who would embody socially or economically conservative principles in
his or her actions in an uncompromising fashion. Working conservatism is the idea that the
application of an ideological stance can have a lasting cultural impact. The idea is not just
“talking the talk” but also “walking the walk.” If a candidate is ideologically conservative, but
can’t implement the policies then there is little point electing them. They must be able to use
their conservatism to influence the values of others as well as government functions. The
working conservative may not necessarily be ideologically pure, but it is a possibility. As
conservatives, candidates put on political faces to be distributed to the public. When creating the
face of a conservative, not only does one present themself in a manner which exalts their positive
experiences but they also engage in passing and avoidance—the arts of downplaying or ignoring
more realistic tributes (Goffman 1959; 1964; [1955] 1967).
True Conservatives
Information that could be categorized as having the face of a true conservative provided
candidates opportunities to claim that their faces were genuine. Being genuine lends itself to the
ideological purity that is necessary to lead to a more conservative nation. Both the 30-second and
60-second versions of Winning Our Future’s advertisement “Time to Choose Newt,” talked
about how Gingrich could “put Obama to shame.” The 60-second version referred to Gingrich as
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a “visionary.” This not only provided Gingrich a manner with a set amount of prestige, but also
allowed him the opportunity to attempt to establish himself as having the status of a thinker and
fighter above that of a partisan actor. “Plastic Men” claimed that Ron Paul was the only
candidate who “listened to our Founding Fathers” while “Someone” by Our Destiny made it
clear that unlike other candidates, Jon Huntsman was “not a phony.” Both of these
advertisements show candidates expressing that they have a manner that is genuine to the
conservative ideology, making them the best candidates to fit within the in-group.
The ability to agitate political opponents was a practice the true conservative could take
pride in. Holding conservative values to their fullest extent would aggravate the left as the
country was slowly taken back. Winning Our Future’s advertisement “Newt on Jobs” showed
footage of Gingrich saying:
Gingrich: I believe, every American of every background has been endowed by
their creator with the right to pursue happiness. And if that makes liberals
unhappy, I’m going to continue to find ways to help poor people learn how to get
a job, learn how to get a better job, and someday learn how to own the job.
It appears that Gingrich is more willing to fight for jobs in order to torment the political left than
to help individuals find work. This allows Gingrich to show himself as having more partisan
policies, siding with political conservatives who can take satisfaction in knowing that his success
will frustrate opponents. This also allows Gingrich to engage in the act of passing to portray
himself as a true conservative. Passing allowed Gingrich to downplay his actual performances,
distancing himself from accusations that he was too moderate and accepting of politically liberal
policies due to working in the Clinton Era.
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Passing was not the only corrective technique used to rearrange information so a
candidate could hide past political experiences; covering was also used to mask their ideological
stances as well. By covering, Huntsman was able to combat some of the criticism he received for
being too moderate. Our Destiny began covering in advertisements such as “Quotes.” “Quotes”
used claims made by George Will, Erick Erickson, and the Wall Street Journal to show that
Huntsman “should be a conservative hero,” and that he was “more conservative than Newt
Gingrich and Mitt Romney combined,” and most importantly, all three agreed that Huntsman
had the best plan to fix the economy. The advertisement “Two” showed a comparison between
Romney and Huntsman, making it clear that Huntsman was significantly more conservative,
claiming Romney was a “chameleon” while Huntsman was a “consistent conservative.”
One of the policies used to develop the face of the true conservative was the act of
owning the concept political isolation and expanding military might as a method of defending the
American way of life. Rather than becoming more involved in the world, candidates wanted to
become more secluded. This seclusion needed to be met with military strength in order to justify
the proposed cut back in international involvement. In “Rebuilding the America We Love,”
Gingrich planned to “regain the world’s respect by standing strong again.” As Gingrich made
this claim, video footage of military training maneuvers was played. The Red, White, and Blue
Fund’s advertisement “America’s Future” made mention of how Santorum wanted to reinstate
America as an international superpower.
When performances that could be categorized as those of true conservatives endorsed
isolationism, it was to prevent America from cultural threats. “Devoted” and “America’s Future”
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by The Red, White and Blue Fund brought up the idea that there was a cultural threat from
involvement with other countries. Both ads show citizens of an unidentified but clearly Arab
nation burning the American flag. “Devoted” says that Santorum is a “leader in the fight against
radical Islam.” The link between the cultural threats that are a consequence of global activity and
America’s energy needs is bolstered through the advertisement “America’s Future”:
Male Voiceover: Under Barack Obama, America is spending 314 billion dollars a
year on foreign oil. Funding radicals with bad intentions causing pump prices to
rise drastically. Rick Santorum is the principled leader with an energy plan.
Develop domestic resources; utilize natural gas, and power generation, and
transportation; open drilling and build pipelines to lower costs; create jobs.
Secure America. Rick Santorum for president. Red, White, and Blue Fund is
responsible for the content of this ad.
Changing America’s energy plan was not just for the purpose of securing America’s economic
strength (as the working conservative would claim), but also to protect America from Islam. This
is direct resistance to being involved with nations beyond America’s borders when it meant
endorsing non-traditional, non-conservative, non-Christian values. By being involved with other
nations, America is, by default, helping its enemies and enhancing their culture. “Obama Bows
Again” was a Gingrich sponsored advertisement, which showed the same sentiments as The Red,
White, and Blue Fund’s ads, that cheap energy can be obtained in America while we
simultaneously diminish our enemies:
Obama: It means that anyone who tells you that we can drill our way out of this
problem doesn’t know what they’re talking about or just isn’t telling you the truth.
On Screen Text: “I am very enthusiastic about [the Saudi] willingness to [boost
oil production] and, hopefully, it will have a downward pressure on prices, which
is what we want…” Energy Secretary Steven Chu
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On Screen Text: If more Saudi drilling works more American drilling works much
better.
Gingrich: If you would like to have national energy—
On Screen Text: For Americans
Gingrich: [A]n American energy policy, never bow to a Saudi King and pay $2.50
a gallon, Newt Gingrich will be your candidate.
The face of the true conservative dealt with international policies based around a fear of
change and the desire for the public to know that they are suspicious of any sort of political
change that may occur (Edelman 2001). If there is not an advocacy for isolation, then American
culture may interact with others and cultural values may, in fact, change. In some ways, these
policies have a mythical component as well, as they rely on the idea that America being a
superpower and culturally superior is imperative to the American way of life, and that anything
else is somehow lesser.
The true conservative’s myths of choice were the idea of the American Dream and a
“simpler America.” While the American Dream may be an idea that many people find hard to
believe, it is still a common theme in political advertising. People may not believe the myth, but
they most certainly want to (Edelman 1964). In campaigns, the political myth is explained by
advocating for simplicity in America. The true conservative’s mystification supporting simplicity
reinforced other aspects of the true conservative’s face. The political community is nuanced and
complex, and to be ideologically pure is rather difficult in a world of nuance. By mystifying the
idea of simplicity candidates could hold on to their ideological claims rather try to deal with real
political situations. When candidates pushed for a simpler America, they spoke in a slower
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soothing voice during the ads. Anita Perry explains what she and her husband view as the
American way of life in the ad “American Story”:
Anita Perry: It’s an old fashioned American story. I married my high school
sweetheart…When Rick’s term in the Air Force ended, he returned home to work
with his dad and asked me to marry him. We grew up in small towns…
Anita Perry’s performance expresses how she and her husband preferred a simpler America, one
that was easier for everyone to understand; through electing her husband, America itself would
become simpler. No longer would the world be a post-industrial terror, but rather more like
Mayberry. In his advertisement “Rebuilding the America We Love” Gingrich expressed many
of the same sentiments, about how simplicity was important to the American Dream and how as
president he could help make this dream achievable:
Gingrich: Some people say the America we know and love is a thing of the past. I
don’t believe that...We can revive our economy and create new jobs…shrink
government and the regulations that strangle our businesses. Throw out the tax
code and replace it with one that is simple and fair…We can return power to the
people and the states we live in so we will have more freedom, opportunity, and
control of our lives.
Like Perry, Gingrich portrayed a simpler America and the American story as concepts
that can be brought to government. By bringing the American way of life to government, the
process of governing is presented as more human and far less bureaucratic than it actually is.
This allows candidates to both endorse conservative ideals and attempt to hide their own
backstage practices by making America “simple” again.
The Working Conservative
What the face of the working conservative offers to the public is a performance that
promises results, often this was tied to policies based in numbers, past records, and successful
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historical moments. As with the true conservative, information is rearranged and presented in a
favorable manner that informs the public or enhances already presented information. Those
holding the performance of the working conservative engage in less passing and covering and
instead choose to subtly engage in more aggressive forms of face work, where they try to show
that their face is the superior choice (Goffman [1955] 1967). This “one-upmanship” within the
campaign cycle was based on candidates directly trying to be more conservative than their
opponents on the same policies. The candidates would offer more tax cuts, more balanced
budgets, and less government involvement in daily life to make them seem as if they were truly
the most conservative. The working conservative also differs from the true conservative as the
working conservative is more pragmatic. This pragmatism allows candidates to express their
ability to make politically conservative policies work, and claims were often focused on
legislating or ending legislation.
The working conservative did not necessarily need past political experience, but if they
lacked governing experience, they needed to explain how their past employment would be
effective in the executive office. In Herman Cain’s advertisement “America Needs Jobs” Cain
emphasized the fact that he had a long history of making jobs and helping the economy, though it
was through the private sector. Cain portrayed his success as one that was political in nature. He
rearranged how the public was informed of his private manner into a life of public and political
service by pointing out that the economy and job growth were not going to get any better until
America put “an executive into the executive office.” He claimed that, if elected, he would be
“America’s CEO in Chief.” His dramatized political encounter showed that business and
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government were so similar that his personal life was, in fact, a political one (Neville-Shepard
and Theye 2013).
While political policy is the most important aspect of a working conservative
performance, of the ads analyzed, only those produced by Gingrich and Perry focused on policy
alone. In ads like “$2.50 Plan” Newt Gingrich promised to provide Americans with gasoline
costing $2.50 or less. Perry placed his policy emphasis on the idea of a part time Congress where
congress would have their work hours and pay cut in half, with the hopes of forcing them to
work second jobs back in their home states when not legislating (“Lazy,” “Leno Ad,” “Part Time
Congress”). However, more often than not, the working conservative candidate held a face that
believed that a smaller less involved government was the key to political success. Candidates
focused on advocating for change in policy through the form of taking no action or cutting
government programs as expressed by the ad “Romney Difference”:
Romney: Let me tell you how I am going to shrink the budget. I am going to
eliminate some programs. The easy one to get rid of is Obamacare. The test
that I am going to apply is “[is] this program is so critical that it makes sense
to borrow money from China to pay for it.”
While Romney’s claim did have elements involving saving face (as he was often linked to
Obamacare) the message of the advertisement was that the government stage needed to, in fact,
be smaller, as he attempted to own the face of a small government. Michele Bachmann showed
similar sentiments in “Waterloo,” stating that she “Will. Not. Vote. To increase the debt ceiling.”
These policies, while not Tea Party references, do tap into the Tea Party ideology of a minimalist
government to the most extreme level, where candidates were pushing not for the government to
do something, but rather to make sure the government could not do anything.
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While both Perry and Paul attempted to own a political policy based around cutting
federal government departments, Paul based his ownership on being more conservative than
Perry’s initial proposal. After Rick Perry’s “Oops” incident, where he forgot the third
government department he would shut down, Ron Paul began producing advertisements offering
to remove five departments of government (“Vote Texas,” “Big Dog”). Paul began airing
advertisements where he claimed he would cut the three that Rick Perry promised to end1:
Commerce, Education, and Energy, as well as the Department of Interior and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. These advertisements serve as an example of the bridge
between those focused on policy for the sake of supporting a political policy and policy for
supporting an image. Candidates also showed competition for political ownership and the need
for working conservatism. A working conservative political policy would be effective for
balancing the budget and cutting what was seen as excessive spending. Candidates may be
pushing for political policies, but they are doing so not simply because they believe it is the way
to govern best, but rather because they want to have a face that the public believes will, in fact,
be able to enact these policies, rather than the face of a candidate who supports a larger more
expansive,“big government.”
The constant focus on “big government” was an attempt by candidates to see who could
own the ability to control the size of the government in people’s daily lives. Whoever could own
the image that their policies and political effectiveness would make a smaller government
possible would have a more politically conservative image, making them a better choice.
1

In Perry’s “Leno Ad” he identified the Department of Energy as the third department he wished to cut, in an
appearance that was one of a saint that will be discussed later.
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The most common themes among both Super PAC and candidate sponsored
advertisements were those relating to economics. When using the face of a working
conservative, economics was the main focus of policy based political advertisements; the main
concerns were the budget, job growth, and economic stability. America’s unemployment
problem was seen as an empty void in the current status of America, and one that could be filled
through private industry. In “America Needs Jobs,” Cain linked the lack of job growth in
America to excessive government spending and an overwhelming national debt:
Cain: The engine of economic growth is the business sector…our 15 trillion
dollar national debt is killing our children’s future, and it’s not going to get any
better until we put an executive in the executive office.
Cain’s accusation that the national debt was harming job growth makes it clear that he believes
government is the problem and not the solution. By calling for an “executive in the executive
office,” Cain also purports his own image in relation to the developments in job growth.
Santorum’s advertisements often spoke of his “Made in the USA” plan (“Best Chance,” “Your
Side”). The plan’s name alone is an attempt to apply some form of symbolic prestige to the
policy as it attempts to support the idea that through Santorum, American ideals can be
accomplished. This was mapped out in the advertisement “Your Side”:
Male Voiceover: Rick Santorum’s “Made in the USA” plan changes everything. It
cuts taxes for Michigan manufacturers to zero, so we can bring back American
jobs from overseas. It also cuts taxes for all workers, and cuts five trillion in
spending over five years balancing the federal budget.
Here too, we see candidates endorsing the idea that government is preventing job growth
and that through a candidate’s proposed policy changes, the government will shrink. “Your Side”
is an advertisement designed to show Santorum is capable of swiftly and effectively doing both.
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While Super PAC ads put much less emphasis on job growth than candidate ads. When Super
PACs did focus on job growth, they did so in a less idealistic way. Rather than depicting job
growth being part of the soul of America, Super PACs chose to look at already existing jobs and
actual policies in place. This allowed for both grounded impressions of candidates and bountiful
attack opportunities. In “Job Creation,” Make Us Great Again pointed out that under Perry’s
leadership, Texas had the most job growth of any state. The first point of Restore Our Future’s
ad “Right Experience” was that Romney “helped create thousands of jobs.” Candidates not only
engaged in job growth, but also showed that even prior to running for office they still held the
face of a working conservative.
Winning Our Future’s economic policy claims are the pure embodiment of the
information within the working conservative typology. The advertisement “Prosperity” focused
not only on job growth but on government spending as well:
Male Voiceover: Under Newt Gingrich, overall spending was slashed. Federal
deficits were turned into record breaking surpluses. 11.1 million jobs were
created, and unemployment dropped.
When focusing on unemployment, the advertisement showed on screen that only 4.3% of
citizens were unemployed. By also mentioning government spending and surpluses, the
advertisement points out that economic concerns were not just those of employment, but also
those of fiscal responsibility, a symbol of working conservatism. This helped to establish
Gingrich as having the face of a working conservative, as his record lent itself to this ideal type
far more than that of the true conservative, which involved much more passing to maintain.
“Washington Machine” and “Big Dog,” advertisements by the Paul campaign, also brought up
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the idea of responsibility through large budget cuts. “Washington Machine” claimed that Paul
had a plan to “cut one trillion dollars in year one, and balance the budget in three.” “Big Dog”
reiterated this point, saying Paul would “cut a trillion dollars in year one. That’s trillion with a
‘T.” These policies that focused on the idea of budget cuts for the sake of responsibility
contributed to the face of the working conservative. These policy framings not only proposed
what were already well known political problems, but in fact, also showed that the face of the
working conservative—particularly the working conservative the ad was meant to support—
would be capable of solving the problem.
While it was generally the true conservative who wanted to be an isolationist, Paul’s ad
“Secure” advocated for isolationist policies from the frame of a working conservative:
Male Voiceover: Ron Paul, a veteran with a plan to keep America Secure. Protect
America by securing our borders and rebuilding our defenses. Not by acting as
the world’s policemen, spending trillions nation building overseas. The Paul plan
for security? Start protecting America’s borders. Stop wasting American money.
Ron Paul. Restore America now.
Paul: I’m Ron Paul and I approve this message.
Border security was partially for the purpose of making sure that immigrants stayed out
of the country, but more importantly for the advertisements, it was to show that there was a need
for America to be a strong, solitary country that did not invest in nation building. Investing in
nation building and other countries did not invite new cultures into America, as the true
conservative claimed, rather the working conservative feared that international activity would
generate ill will toward America from those who were not receiving aid, and that the American
military might be drawn into conflicts with nations that are being financially supported.
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If idolatry was political, Reagan would hold a demigod status. His influence on the
Republican Party and their desire to be like him has lead to some infamy (Coombs 2013).
Working conservatives often chose to use the myth of Ronald Reagan, particularly Gingrich and
his Super PAC Winning Our Future. In two separate advertisements, Gingrich was shown sitting
next to Ronald Reagan working with him. It was made to seem that not only was Reagan
endorsing Gingrich, but that Reagan’s charisma and political savvy touched Gingrich and he was
given access to a portion of Reagan’s power. When Reagan was shown next to Gingrich, the
advertisements made sure to point out that Gingrich was an inspiring, experienced leader that
would lead to prosperity—just as Reagan has been made out to be.
Saints, Sinners, and Traitors
While being politically conservative was the most important aspect of the 2012 primary,
candidates used other faces as well. Candidates often took the role of the saint, a semi-political
character. Saints often chose to exemplify their character in non-partisan ways, and when they
made mention of being conservative, it was for non-political purposes. Because political
performances were beyond the hands of a single candidate, there were also ideal negative
performances which were often based around the idea that a candidate was not conservative.
This was the role of the sinner. The sinner was inauthentic, partisan, uninterested in the public,
and was often far more liberal than the true or even working conservatives. This differs from the
second negative performance of the traitor, as the traitor not only endorsed some liberal policies,
but also intentionally betrayed the American public or voluntarily contradicted conservative
principles for their own personal advancement.

54
The Saint
Saintship was important for candidates because it allowed them to exemplify the fact that
they lived their own lives by the values they claimed to support, and that they would hold these
values in public office as well. When saints wanted to be seen as Washington outsiders, they
made sure their performances expressed that they were genuinely better than Washington
insiders. Saints did their best to make it appear that candidates were more ethical, more
intelligent, and more genuine than their competitors in every aspect of life.
In order to show a candidate could be identified as a saint more than their opponents,
advertisements chose to place emphasis on the biography of a candidate, notably to either
downplay or focus on the fact that a candidate was a politician in order to support the idea of
sainthood. When showing that a candidate was not a politician, the encounters were designed so
that candidate’s identity was closer to that of an average human being, rather than the identity of
a Washington insider. Michele Bachmann engaged in this strategy. In her advertisement
“Waterloo,” Bachmann identified herself as a “parent, foster mother, tax lawyer, and now a job
creator,” however the advertisement never referred to her as a congresswoman. “Waterloo” also
showed old, faded pictures of her family. If that was not enough to humanize her, her
advertisement “America’s Iron Lady2” called her “one of our own,” and included faded baby
pictures of Bachmann, similar to those in “Waterloo,” and the advertisement “Voices Part 2”
openly had testimonial claiming that she was not a politician.

2

This advertisement briefly used the myth of the true conservative, showing a picture of Bachmann to Margaret
Thatcher for the sake of political mythmaking.
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Perry attempted to identify himself as a political outsider as well. In his late December
advertisement “Part Time Congress,” he opens with pictures of Bachmann, Paul, Gingrich and
Santorum with a voiceover asking, “If Washington is the problem, then why trust a congressman
to fix it?” This made the message of the rest of the advertisement clear: Perry was not a political
insider, did not have insider associations, and was not corrupt like many political insiders were.
While campaigning, he made an appearance on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno. During the
commercial break he aired an advertisement in Iowa known as “Leno Ad.” In this ad, Perry
showed a video of his failure during the “Oops” moment in debate leading to public humiliation.
He followed the video by finishing the list, claiming the third department to be cut would be the
department of energy, followed by him saying, “You know a lot of us have lost our train of
thought before, but not a lot of us have done it on national TV.” Perry attempted to use this
advertisement as a method of avoidance, downplaying or justifying failures in one’s performance
(Goffman [1955] 1967). This avoidance served not only as a method of damage control for his
campaign, but also to make it into a humanizing moment showing he held the face of a saint by
being just like the common man and not a political elite.
As both Bachmann and Perry claimed to be political outsiders, they engaged in
performances that were able to place focus on their positive traits, notably those of Saintship.
This allowed candidates to see the faces of saints and know what these saints consisted of
internally. These advertisements were in part biographical, and by being biographical, they were
able to not only establish candidates as saints, but also to limit how they can be presented by
themselves and others (Goffman 1964). The biographical claims made in advertisements do
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have some inconsistencies with other aspects of political campaigning. One emerging aspect of
campaigning is the need for candidates to produce their own personal memoirs (Neville-Shepard
and Theye 2013). In memoirs produced by 2012 primary runners, the candidates made sure to
make note of the fact that their life was one of hardship and overcoming adversity and
challenges, and that is what made them saints rather than being outsiders (Neville-Shepard and
Theye 2013). In campaign advertisements, it was not hardship that made individuals Washington
outsiders, but rather it was having different cultural values and not being incorporated into large
political institutions such as the executive branch.
Hall and Hewitt (1970) made it clear that no one truly knows what “American Values”
are, but they are still useful for talking points. This was not lost on saints in the 2012 primary.
Oftentimes candidates spoke of having values or being by guided by principles. It was never
directly explained what these values and principles were. While Perry did claim to be guided by
“hard work, faith, and family” in an ad titled “Values,” and Rand Paul did explain that his father
taught him the value of, “faith, family, and the constitution” in “Principled Leadership.” But
neither Perry nor Rand Paul bothered to explain how these principles actually mattered or
affected their political practices. The 2012 campaign memoirs often shared a similar problem,
where values were mentioned but it was never revealed what they truly consisted of (NevilleShepard and Theye 2013). In advertisements, the idea of “faith” was presented less for the
purpose of showing that candidates believed they had a duty to the public, but rather how they
were guided in life and how their faith influenced choices. This contrasts from their memoirs, in
which campaigns expressed faith as what guided them through their decision making (Neville-
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Shepard and Theye 2013). Instead of faith, candidates argued it was being “principled” that
would guide them through their decisions. Being “principled” was something that The Red,
White, and Blue Fund emphasized greatly. While it was not only Santorum’s Super PAC that
talked of being principled it was the primary value used in many of the Red, White, and Blue
Fund’s advertisements, such as “Pride”:
Male Voiceover: He’s the principled conservative. Rick Santorum is
determined and will never waver.
Santorum: What wins in America are bold ideas, sharp contrasts, and a plan
that includes everyone. A plan that includes people from all across the
economic spectrum. A plan that says we will work together to get America to
work.
Male Voiceover: Rick Santorum, an American we can trust. Red, White, and
Blue Fund is responsible for the content of this ad.
“Pride” shows the importance of being principled, as it allowed Santorum to identify himself as
someone who was guided enough to follow through on plans that would be inclusive to all
Americans.
Candidates produced images of themselves as socially and politically conservative, and
by doing so they had “values.” If they were to be anything other than conservative, they would
have been amoral, but because they do have morals, they are unfaltering and unwavering as they
are guided through their legislative practices. This was a point brought up both by Perry and
Paul. Perry mentioned it in his advertisement “Values”:
Perry: As a son of tenant farmers from the West Texas town of Paint Creek, I
learned the values of hard work, faith and family. I took those values with me
when I served our country as a pilot in the Air Force…The values I learned
served me well as Governor of Texas, and will continue to guide me as President.
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And his wife Anita Perry did so as well in the advertisement “American Story”:
Anita Perry: We grew up in small towns, raised with Christian values. Values we
still believe in. And we know Washington D.C. could use some of that.
Ron Paul’s advertisement “Staying on the Right Path” also shared similar concerns about being
guided by principles to the fullest extent possible. Marcie Holt and another testimonial from a
patient named Diane Wilson explain:
Holt: I love the fact that he hasn’t changed in all these years. Ron’s still the same
guy, saying the same things…
Wilson: It’s not hard for someone who is a Christian and truly believes to stay on
the right path. And I think that’s what sort of person Ron is.
The ability to live one’s life by values and principles as saints has a borderline evangelical
quality to it. These principles are to be brought to Washington and saints are to spread their
values in an infectious manner to other politicians. Saints are often presented as candidates that
are expected to influence the presentations of others with the hope of reshaping policies and
political activity.
The most extreme aspect of mythmaking was done when candidates were attempting to
show the face of a saint. Candidates did not compare themselves to the metaphorical Christ that
is Ronald Reagan, but to the actual savior of the Christian faith. Restore Our Future attempted to
engage in this with the advertisement “Saved.” The ad was testimony of Robert Gay, a past
business partner of Romney’s. Gay spoke of the time when Romney helped find his lost daughter
by temporarily shutting down their company in order to find the girl. At one point Gay said,
“Mitt’s done a lot of things that people say are nearly impossible,” and the end of the ad shows
Mitt looking downward, as a glowing halo surrounds his head. This is a common image used in
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paintings of Christ where the halo is not an actual golden ring, but rather a spherical light that
illuminates the face.
While Restore Our Future may have produced “Saved,” Paul and RevPAC incorporated
some form of Christ-like imagery into almost every advertisement they produced. In his own ads,
Paul was portrayed as the last hope that could save America, while this is common in all
advertising, only Paul’s ads promised that he was “incorruptible,” “he won’t falter,” he was
capable of “bring[ing] peace” to America, and above the problems of the political machine.
“Plastic Men” by RevPAC took the Christ-like imagery even further. In the advertisement, the
voiceover pointed out that “everything he has predicted has come true” as a magazine showed a
picture of Paul with “The Prophet” written over his head. This godlike image Paul gave himself
allowed him to support his other images as a strong, pure, and Christian leader in a manner so
extreme that one wonders if it is based on any “real” candidate and if a man named Ron Paul
even exists at all.
The conservative saint must have strong, principled, Christian values, meaning that one
will never change policies or positions under any circumstance. Being guided by values was a
zero-sum game. If candidates were truly saints as well as conservatives, their opinions would
never change. If any action ever endorsed a liberal policy in any way, a candidate was without
principles. Otherwise they would be a sinner.
The Sinner
In many ways the sinner is the reflexive opposite of the true conservative and the saint. A
candidate would take on the face of being the sinner against his or her will, through continuous
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acts of discrediting by his or her opponents. Attacks made toward candidates were based in
exposing a character’s blemishes rather than positive performances based in exposing a
candidate’s prestige. Rather than being conservative, bold, and uncompromising, the sinner is
timid and often liberal. The primary non-referential economic critique of sinners was focused on
the concern that if elected, candidates would work to expand the size of the federal government.
Sinners were accused of working toward policies that created a larger government with more
spending. Focusing on spending and earmarks was particularly popular when targeting Rick
Santorum due to past claims that he was proud of the earmarks he put in bills (“Difference,”
“Proud,” “Never”).
While Santorum was attacked for his government spending, other candidates were
discredited with the threat that the expansion of government would lead to a lack of individual
autonomy. Romney was discredited for expanding the government when the public was
reminded of his contributions toward Obamacare; while Gingrich could not be directly linked to
Obamacare, his past support of health insurance mandates exposed him to similar criticisms.
Oftentimes, the size of government was not related to specific concerns for debt and spending,
but was presented as a concern for the autonomy of individuals. These were logical appeals
regarding individual autonomy and the size of government. RevPAC’s advertisement “Plastic
Men” brought up similar concerns about Perry as he “tried to force girls in Texas to be injected
with an STD vaccine,” while showing a cartoon picture of Perry dressed as a mad scientist. The
expansion of government would mean that political stages would become vaster as well; there
would be more room for bureaucracies involved in the daily lives of voters. Political affairs are
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often seen as performances that the audience may be forced to engage in at certain periods, but
they do not dominate their lives (Hall 1972; Edelman 1964). Threats of a “big government” that
break these boundaries are proposed to scare voters into believing that the government will be
involved in more aspects of their lives, and as a result, they will have to become more engaged
with the government.
The Traitor
Like the sinner, the traitor was formed through the act of discrediting not through
blemishes, but rather of in-group/out-group concerns. Goffman (1963) made note of the fact that
members of in-groups not only naturally belonged, but those in out-groups not only did not fit in,
but also often worked against the in-group. The face of the traitor was not simply one lacking
positive personal qualities, but the performance of the traitor was of one who went out of their
way to intentionally contradict the practices offered in conservative performances. While most
treacherous acts were based in concepts such as mudslinging and the political backstage, there
were other attacks that were based in political liberalism as well. These attacks differ from when
candidates play the part of the sinner as they show candidates embracing the highest level of
hypocrisy possible. Santorum was known for being one of the most pro-life candidates, which
was part of his political appeal to many social conservatives (Coombs 2013). Santorum took
pride in this stance but had actions that directly contradicted it. Restore Our Future took
advantage of these contradictions in the advertisement “Own Words”:
Female Voiceover: Santorum says he is the principled conservative, but that’s not
how he voted. Here are Santorum’s own words on voting to fund Planned
Parenthood.
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Santorum: While I have a personal moral objection to it, even though I d—I don’t
support it, that I voted for bills that included it.
Female Voiceover: 20 years in Washington changed Santorum’s principles.
Despite moral objections, Santorum failed to spread his core principles into all his
policies. What the rest of Santorum’s political history consisted of was irrelevant.
Santorum pushed for legislation that supported Planned Parenthood, and that single
infringement was enough to bring about attempts to discredit him as a traitor. “Own
Words” suggested that Santorum would compromise his values, and therefore he could
not support a working conservatism, and if he is without values, he might as well be a
liberal.
Mudslinging was uncommon in the primary. However, mudslinging was still used, and
when it was, the attacks were unapologetic and aimed toward traitors. Winning Our Future
produced an advertisement called “Think You Know Mitt?” that focused on Romney’s past
position on abortion in a particular fashion:
Female Voiceover: Think you know Mitt? He claims to be pro-life but here’s what
he told voters of Massachusetts when he was running for governor:
Romney: I will preserve and protect a woman’s right to choose and am devoted
and dedicated to honoring my word in that regard…And with regards to this issue
of age of consent? It is currently 18 years old if one wants to have an abortion
younger than that, one must have the permission of one parent and if a parent
doesn’t go along one can go to a judge or justice to get that permission.
Female Voiceover: He said what?
Romney: And if a parent doesn’t go along one can go to a judge or justice to get
that permission.
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Female Voiceover: You heard right, Mitt Romney thinks a judge should be able to
give permission to a minor to get an abortion over the objection of a parent.
Winning Our Future attacked Romney because he claimed government officials can override the
decisions of parents, and if Romney has his way, the next parent who could be disregarded might
be the viewer. These political attacks that were purely slanderous were also accompanied by
advertisements based in projection and deflection.
Candidates would put out advertisements that accused their opponents of mudslinging.
The irony of these accusations is that they are, in themselves, mudslinging. In Gingrich’s
advertisement “We Deserve Solutions,” he said, “We want and deserve solutions. Others seem to
be more focused on attacks rather than moving the country forwards.” Gingrich’s indirect
mudslinging was based in the accusation of mudslinging. Rick Santorum’s advertisement
“Rombo” embodies this accusation perfectly. The advertisement features a Romney look-a-like
armed with a paintball gun that shoots balls of mud. The man who is supposed to be Romney
roams through an empty warehouse shooting at large cardboard cut outs of Santorum that never
seem to hit the targets. A voiceover in the ad claims that, “Mitt Romney’s negative attack
machine is back. On full throttle. This time Romney is firing his mud at Santorum.” Santorum
made the attack with the hopes that the vitriol of mudslinging and using Super PACs would leave
viewers frothing at the mouth. But the ads from the “negative attack machine” were not actually
mudslinging, rather they were other forms of attacks.
The use of deflective mudslinging was less for the purpose of making a political attack,
and more for the sake of covering, the act of burying one’s activity to hide it from the public
(Goffman 1964). The defensive mudslinging involved allowed candidates to present themselves
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with one of the most criticized aspects of politics, while performing the very same act. As
Goffman (1959) explained, bringing the backstage to public viewing is a genuinely bad idea. But
that does not stop it from happening within political advertising. When attacking a candidate’s
past record or personal associations, oftentimes the backstage is brought forward. Not every
attack based on associations or a candidate’s record would be considered bringing the backstage
forward. Only the advertisements that reveal content that was meant to be partially or entirely
hidden from the public can truly qualify. While candidates are criticized for public policy
support, this is different than a candidate taking money from a large organization or working
with other politicians while in Washington D.C. By working on the backstage, candidates were
presented as holding a different political manner, meaning that the public is expected to respond
differently, treating candidates as traitors rather than as sinners. This was a particularly popular
focus for ads that were based in personal attacks or on a candidate’s affiliations.
In Super PAC advertisements, there was less of a focus on attacking the backstage. The
backstage was attacked in two advertisements used by Restore Our Future and one by Winning
Our Future. Winning Our Future’s advertisement “Questionable” attacks Romney’s record in the
private sector, accusing him of never being interested in job creation, and being more focused
toward monetary gains. In “Smiling,” Restore Our Future attacked Gingrich for taking money
from Freddie Mac, pharmaceutical companies, and political inconsistencies:
Female Voiceover: Newt has a ton of baggage. Like the fact that Gingrich was
fined $300,000 for ethics violations, or that he took at least 1.6 million dollars
from Freddie Mac just before the meltdown. Then there’s the $37 million
Gingrich took from healthcare and industry groups. And on the issues? He’s been
on all sides…Gingrich even teamed up with Nancy Pelosi and Al Gore on global
warming.
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Super PAC advertisements brought out the backstage to imply that candidates had ulterior
motives, rather than simply being corrupt. These exposures embraced the idea that a candidate’s
loyalty to a political party was based in his or her own ideology, rather than one that is meant to
help the party as a whole (Goffman 1959; Edelman 1964). Romney’s disinterest in job creation
and Newt Gingrich being open to bribery showed that they were less interested in the American
people and more interested in themselves.
Gingrich was the main target of candidate sponsored advertisements as well. Here too,
Gingrich was constantly targeted for his backroom associations, particularly in taking 1.6 million
dollars from Freddie Mac right before the housing crisis began (“Florida Families,” “Nevada
Families,” “History Lesson”) and taking money from healthcare organizations while working at
a think tank (“Serial Hypocrisy”). Gingrich was also constantly accused of working on the
backstage to the point of corruption. However, when attacks on Gingrich were made by
candidates rather than Super PACs the discrediting acts presented the backstage in a different
manner. Rather than simply being corrupt, these advertisements proposed that a candidate’s
behavior was harmful to the entire American political system. Ron Paul’s advertisement “Newt
Gingrich: Serial Hypocrisy” begins with Gingrich talking about the political environment
followed by a series of attacks on Gingrich regarding how he contributed to it:
Gingrich: If you want to put people in jail, let’s look at the politicians that created
the environment. The politicians who profited from the environment.
[The politicians who profited from the environment is replayed three times]
Male Voiceover: Newt Gingrich on the defense for taking 1.5 million bucks after
he left congress…
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Bob Beckel: A think tank founded by Newt Gingrich collected at least $37 million.
A group that supports individual mandates…
Different Male voiceover: Everything that Gingrich railed against when he was in
the house he went the other way on when he got paid to go the other way.
Romney’s ad “History Lesson” took a similar approach:
Newscaster: Good Evening. Newt Gingrich, who came to power after preaching a
higher standard in American politics…tonight he has on his own record the
judgment of his peers, Democrat and Republican alike…found him guilty of ethics
violations…several of them raised questions about his future effectiveness.
Not only did this attack go after Gingrich as a traitor, but it also reveals that the backstage is a
place where corruption is known and accepted, and implied that if Gingrich were to be elected
president, it would only increase the amount of political corruption in Washington.
Gingrich was also attacked for working with Nancy Pelosi, particularly on the topic of
climate change and UN related legislation that would help promote China’s one child policy
(“Whoops,” “Risk (FL),” “Desperate”). But it was not only Gingrich who was accused of
working on the political backstage with Democrats. In Michele Bachmann’s ad “America’s Iron
Lady,” the announcer boasted that she did not make deals with Obama, unlike other republicans3.
In itself, there is nothing wrong with working with politicians on the other side of the
political aisle. It is often necessary for legislation to pass through Congress, but by portraying
bipartisan activity as something that was meant to be secretive; candidates can be seen as
untrustworthy and unloyal to a political party. When accusations of bipartisanship are made, it is
less important that candidates are attempting to legislate, but rather the moral implications of

3

No particular Republicans were specified.
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those associations are what are of concern. Working with a Democrat on the backstage is not a
sign of weakness, but rather a sign of treason. This treason is one that is harmful to the state of
the nation and its political processes. By working with liberals, traitors are empowering them
within the government, and by doing so are making the government worse and a destructive
force toward the American people.
Gingrich was not the only target of attacks associating candidates with the backstage. The
most unique incident where the backstage was brought out was Rick Santorum’s ad “Rombo.”
“Rombo” is noteworthy, as it not only attacks Romney for fundraising, but it openly attacks him
for having a Super PAC and using the Super PAC funding to attack Santorum. While Santorum
does intentionally exclude his associations with the Red, White, and Blue Fund from the
advertisement, it is an open admission that candidates are capable of working with Super PACs.
Like other attacks in candidate sponsored advertisements, “Rombo” focused on the idea of
candidates harming the political process, though it was not also delegated to accuse Romney of
treason. The use of a Super PAC suggests the possibility of corruption, presented in a manner
that harms a political system through bribery. By using actual mud, the use of Super PACs is
presented as a literally “dirty” practice, but it is not considered one that is extortive of the
American population as attacks toward Gingrich were.
The purpose of revealing the backstage is to expose the secretive activities of candidates
to the public. Candidates are not simply associated with other organizations but rather a broader,
corrupt political machine. This is impractical, but typical of political advertisements. The
backstage emerges when candidates want to show the moral failures of other candidates; their
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greed, corruption, and unethical behavior. Super PACs expose social and political backstages not
to discredit candidates through accusations of corruption, but rather to focus on showing that a
candidate does not have the public’s best interest in mind, and are running based on their own
personal agenda. Candidates attack each other for their records and associations to bring new
information to the public. This information makes claims that the political system is inherently
corrupt.
Admitting candidates are capable of working with Super PACs, Democrats, corporate
interests, and lobbyists, while intentionally raising their own pay during economic stagnation, the
primary candidates did the unthinkable: they destroyed the secrecy regarding the backstage. No
longer is the political backstage of Republicans separate from the corporate backstage or the
backstage used by liberals. The 2012 advertisements link all the backstages together. By
revealing that the backstages are partially, or possibly entirely, one and the same, the candidates
show not only their own party’s corruption, but that they are no better than any other political or
corporate organization. This exposure also means that the backstage, where new impressions are
formed and cultivated prior to public appearances, has been revealed. Doing this allows
candidates to suggest that their opponents are using the backstage to build impressions that hide
their corruption and destructive behavior. While this may hurt the Republican Party as a whole,
the candidates seem relatively unmoved by the long term consequences of the activity. The shift
in focus of primaries toward winning a nomination at any cost creates counterintuitive political
activity as long as it allows for candidates to move on to the next step.
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It does not matter if candidates and their Super PACs do not reveal their own backstage
activity, because another candidate or Super PAC will. By attacking each other’s backstage
behaviors, each candidate, as well as the political institution’s behavior, has become exposed. It
may be that in order to ensure a more level playing field, each candidate must expose the
backstage of his or her opponents. If a candidate’s backstage is revealed and his opponent’s stage
is not, then the candidate stands out as the only one who is involved with political corruption,
rather than everyone being involved. To candidates, the ability to say that they are not the only
guilty party may be a way to excuse questionable activity.
Beyond backstage exposures and mudslinging, accusations of treason were also based in
political myths. Edelman’s (1988; 1964) concept that the political myth is unbreakable and that
going against it is a social taboo is the base of some performances as a sinner. The condemnation
of candidates through myths comes from accusations that they choose to go against the myths.
Because Gingrich was so close to the man worshipped by the Republican Party, there needed to
be an attempt to separate the two of them. Restore Our Future performed this task in “Continue
to Fail”:
Female Voiceover: In debates Newt Gingrich likes to talk about Ronald
Reagan…but here is what Newt said about Reagan’s leadership when Reagan
was actually president.
Gingrich: Measured against the scale and challenge of the Soviet Empire’s
challenge the Reagan administration has failed, is failing, [and] will continue to
fail. President Reagan is clearly failing.
This attack on Gingrich for his criticism of Reagan is noteworthy. Because of Reagan’s mythic
status, it is nearly impossible to criticize him without a negative backlash, as no one who
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supports the myth will believe any criticism (Edelman 1964). Yet now candidates also have
access to Super PACs, where they can promote images with fewer risks. Only through Super
PACs can this image production be effectively made by a candidate. By revealing that Gingrich
attempted to discredit Ronald Reagan, he has committed an act of sacrilege that cannot be
forgiven. This advertisement would not be possible for a candidate to officially produce, as any
mention of Romney in an advertisement accusing Gingrich of this heretical behavior may leave
negative images of Romney for exposing something that might in fact be a weakness in the
Republican legend. By revealing everything that a politician could want hidden: their corruption,
their associations, their hypocrisy, and most importantly, their treason, the traitor was by far the
most damning role a candidate could have taken on, making it the most popular for attacks and
the most necessary to defend against.
Region and Timing in Political Ads
Thielman and Wilhite (1998) found that as campaigns go onward they do in fact become
more negative. However, it may not be the length of the campaign, but rather when during the
campaign ads are aired that influences the negativity of advertisements. This would most
certainly be true of the 2012 Republican Primary. During the earliest months of the primary,
particularly in December, advertisements were overwhelmingly positive, focusing on images of
saints and true conservatives. However, in January, when primary voting actually began,
candidates and Super PAC ads were overwhelmingly filled with negative images as candidates
began to accuse each other of being sinners and traitors. Appendix E shows this to be particularly
true of Super PAC ads which were more negative. During March, a great deal of the negative
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imagery from earlier in the campaign had vanished. While many ads did contain criticism, the
advertisements were primarily those using the image of working conservatives, only at the very
end of the campaign did policy proposals become prominent in campaign advertisements.
While no region of the United States was without both Super PAC and candidate sponsored
advertisements, states in the Midwest and the South received the overwhelming majority of all
advertisements. In January and February, Super PACs placed a great deal of emphasis on the
South (Christenson and Smidt 2014). It was at this time that candidates also began to air fewer
advertisements overall. Appendix F shows that during January and February, candidates aired
fewer advertisements than Super PACs. These were also the months where the South received
the majority of advertisement focus, meaning that Southern states were disproportionately
impacted by Super PACs.
Because the South was impacted by Super PACs more than other regions, those who
lived within the South also were also exposed to more negative advertisements. This shows the
importance of Kang’s (2013:1919) concept of Super PACS serving as “alter-egos” to candidates.
As candidates stepped down, their alter-egos would emerge and supplement the campaign with
the use of negative advertising. This contrasts the Southern states from those in the Midwest,
particularly Iowa, where positive imagery was much more common. While this is highly likely
due to advertisements being aired during the months where voting occurred, it also shows that
candidates and Super PACs have different expectations of different regions of the United States:
The South, which tends to be more conservative, is believed to be more accepting of negative
political advertisements than the Midwest.
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There is a link between candidate performance types, region, and timing however further
understanding calls for future exploration. Different performances within the typology may
resonate with different regional demographics, which would expand upon the importance and
depth of impression management during political campaigns, particularly when Super PACs
become involved.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There are a few limitations to this research, but overall the study of political impression
management in a single campaign created a clear understanding of how Super Political Action
Committees (PACs) and candidates cooperate to construct images in political television ads.
However, an in-depth comparison between campaigns would also be useful. As mentioned in the
methods section, third party Super PAC ads were not analyzed, as they deserve a full separate
analysis. These third party Super PACs may have their own set of ideal types and could be
compared to those of the candidate and Super PACs they are connected to. While ethnographic
content analysis may be able to analyze the images created by campaigns, it is not a substitute for
ethnographic fieldwork on the campaign trail or in advertising firms, which should be the next
step in the sociological research of political campaign advertisements and Super PACs. By
following campaigns and advertising firms, a stronger understanding of what messages and
information the creators of these television ads truly wish to present might be understood. This
could be complemented by analyzing the public’s reception and interpretation of said ads to test
the successful reception of messages. While television ads are still where campaigns spend the
majority of their finances, this may not always be the case. In future years, internet advertising
may surpass television, and when that occurs, the same typologies will still be usable as a
guiding force. Candidates and Super PACs will still be working on impression management for
political campaigns, making the change a new allocation of resources rather than an overhaul in
candidate performances and messages.
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Because Super PAC ads aired primarily when primary votes occurred, the effects were
twofold: First, candidates were able to free up their funding for purposes beyond advertisements,
which brought about more fundraising opportunities. Second, candidates held less accountability
for advertisements, particularly negative advertisements, when the general public was allowed to
vote. This meant that candidates were able to capitalize on the value of negative advertisements
during the most critical point during the primary campaign, while minimizing the consequences
of using Stand By Your Ad (SBYA) statements. However more analysis on the relationship
between region and Super PAC advertisements is needed. It is unclear if Southern states being
the main target of Super PAC advertisements was merely a coincidence or if there is an
additional need to avoid SBYA claims in the South. Different regions of the United States may
be more open to different character performance types, and if the South is more accepting of
attack advertisements, then it only makes sense that that is where Super PACs place their
resources to capitalize on the benefits of negative ads while reducing liability.
Through the typology I formulated in this study, candidates arranged political
information in order to frame themselves as having the face of one of five candidate types: the
true conservative, the working conservative, the saint, the sinner, and the traitor. When playing
the role of the true conservative, candidates talked about how they were ideologically pure and
would stand for conservative values, as the working conservative offered concrete results from
said values. As the name of Ronald Reagan and the American Dream were used for support, both
promised to take America back from liberals and conservatives who did not follow through.
Meanwhile, the saints showed their exemplary lives to the public offering a trustworthy
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politician in office who could handle the presidency. As candidates began to discredit each other
in later months, through casting others sinners who were weak and traitors that were deceptive.
These performances are “ideal types” and often do not purely appear on the political front stage.
Often candidates use components from multiple performance types at a single time and will
engage in all performances at some point during campaigns. There is little question whether
Super PACs designed to support candidates did in fact do so. Super PACs designed political
encounters that would enhance or compliment the performances of candidates. The typology I
developed shows not only the shift on the front stage, but the expansion of the backstage because
of the influence of Super PACS. The reciprocal nature of the political front and backstages is
altered as there are now new players involved gathering information and involved with political
organizing in the back, as new characters take on more control over the images involved in the
front.
The significance of this study on the newly introduced Super PACs into campaigns is that
it specifically shows how they allow candidates to interact with each other in new ways that
change their ad performances. Goffman’s ideas of impression management, particularly in
relationship to face work, show that information and ideas are arranged and presented in order to
change how people respond or feel regarding ideas and individuals, and this is exactly what
advertisements are: a planned and structured presentation of information with the hopes of
allowing viewers to respond in a desired manner. Peter M. Hall’s meso-level symbolic
interactionist analysis, combined with ethnographic content analysis, allows for cultural artifacts,
such as political ads, to be used as a way to indicate how individuals, institutions, and large
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political organizations interact with each other. In the case of political campaigns, advertisements
become the way candidate campaigns and Super PACs send and respond to messages to each
other and the public. Because Super PACs are not directly linked to candidates, the similarities
and cooperation in political impression management techniques between Super PACs and
candidates shows that even without working together, a precise political performance can be
constructed. Through Super PACS, candidates can now attack each other with less liability and
more resources. Potentially unlimited funds, with a now reduced liability, allow campaigns to
make more drastic attempts at the alteration of political impressions and provide more
opportunities to do so as well. The existence of Super PACs will continue to fuel negative
campaign advertisements, and there is no sign of Super PACs losing their ability to influence
campaigns any time soon.
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CODE SHEET
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General Questions
1. Candidate/Super PAC:______________________________
2. Commercial ID: ______________________________________
3. Length of Commercial (in seconds):_________________
4. Date of ad ______________________
5. What Regions Was the Ad Aired in? (Code 1 if present, 0 if not present)
1. North East
2. Midwest
3. West
4. South
5. N/A
6. Is the advertisement an image or an issue ad?
1. Issues
2. Images
3. Issues, with some images used
4. Images, with some issues used
Targeting
7. Format
1. Documentary
2. Video clip/music video
3. Testimonial
4. Introspection
5. Issue Statement
6. Stages Press Conference
7. Opposition focused
8. Issue Dramatization
0. Other (specify) ____________
8. Who is the ad focused on?
1. Candidate-Positive Focused
2. Negative Focused
3. Candidate-Positive, but attacks are made
4. Negative Focused, but positive images are shown
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9. If there is an attack made, who makes the attack?
1. The Candidate
2. The Surrogate
3. Anonymous announcer
4. No attack
10. If a negative attack is made who is focused on? (Code 1 if present, 0 if not present)
1. Opponent
2. Obama/Democrats
11. If an attack is made on Obama/the Democrats what is the purpose or nature of the attack?
(Code 1 if present, 0 if not present)
1. Attack on personal characteristics of opponent.
2. Attack on issue stands/consistency of opponent.
3. Attack on opponent’s group affiliations or associations.
4. Attack on opponent’s background/qualifications.
5. Attack on opponent’s performance in past offices/positions.
12. If an attack is made on competing Republicans what is the purpose or nature of the attack?
(Code 1 if present, 0 if not present)
1. Attack on personal characteristics of opponent.
2. Attack on issue stands/consistency of opponent.
3. Attack on opponent’s group affiliations or associations.
4. Attack on opponent’s background/qualifications.
5. Attack on opponent’s performance in past offices/positions.
13. What types of attacks were made?
1. Vote against a candidate, not for one
2. Direct comparisons to candidates
3. Indirect comparisons to candidates
14. What is the dominant appeal within the ad?
1. Logical
2. Emotional
15. Content of appeals in ad (Code 1 if present, 0 if not present)
1. Emphasis on partisanship of candidate
2. Issue-related: Candidate’s issue concern
3. Issue-related: Policy Reference
4. Personal characteristics of candidate
5. Linking a candidate w/ specific character
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16. What are the main topics in the advertisement? (Code 1 if present, 0 if not present)
1. Competency and the presidency
2. Charisma and the presidency
3. Calling for changes
4. Emphasizing optimism for the future
5. Speaking to “traditional values”
6. Appearing to represent the philosophical center of the party.
7. Consulting or negotiating with world leaders
8. Endorsements from the party or other leaders
9. Emphasizing a candidate’s accomplishments
10. Depending on surrogates to speak
11. Taking the offensive position on an issue
12. Attacking the record of Obama
13. Attacking the record of another primary candidate
14. Other______________
Image Questions
17. In the ad, is the candidate endorsed by another party member?
0. No
1. Yes
18. Can American symbols be seen within the Ad?
0. No
1. Yes
18a. If yes, please mark present or absent for the following:
1. Flag
2. National Colors
3. Famous American Landscapes
4. National Bird (Eagle)
5. Famous documents (such as constitution)
6. Representations of prior president/famous figures
7. Other__________
19. Were there any images or references to religion and God made in the ad?
0. No
1. Yes
19a. Were any religious images used within ads? (Code 1 if present, 0 if not present)
1. Directly mentioning the Judeo-Christian God
2. Crosses, churches, and traditional Christian symbols
3. Suggestions of ungodliness or rejecting religious values
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4. Holiday greetings
5. Positive references to Islam and Sharia Law
6. Negative references to Islam and Sharia Law
6. Positive references to Judaism
7. Negative references to Judaism
20. Was there a reference to the tea party?
0. No
1. Yes
20a. Was the reference associating the candidate with the tea party?
1. The tea party was referenced, but no links were made
2. The tea party was referenced and linked to the candidate
3. The tea party was referenced, and linked to an opponent(s)
21. Who is speaking? (Code for dominant speaker)
1. Candidate
2. Other office holder/politician
3. Competing candidate
4. Democrat
5. Non Government Celebrity
6. Family Member
7. Announcer
8. Other/Combination_________
22. Does the candidate appear in the ad?
0. No
1. Yes
[If answered no to 22 skip to 23]
22a. Is the candidate usually (Code for dominant expression)
1. Smiling
2. Attentive/Serious
3. Frowning/Glaring
4. Other
22b. Rate of Speech
1. Slow
2. Moderate
3. Fast
4. The candidate does not speak
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22c. Dress Code
1. Formal
2. Casual
3. Varied/unclear
23. Does the candidate’s family appear in the ad?
1. Spouse
2. Children
3. Spouse and children.
4. Other
5. No family in the ad
24. What Candidate Characteristics are emphasized in the ad? (Code 1 if present, 0 if not
present)
1. Honesty/Integrity
2. Toughness/Strength
3. Warmth/Compassion
4. Competency
5. Performance/Success
6. Aggressiveness
7. Activeness
8. Qualifications
Issue Questions
25. Is the term “values” used in the ad?
0. No
1. Yes
25a. Were any specific values mentioned or implied?
0. No
1. Yes
25b. If yes, was the main value spoken about: ______________________________
26. Which of the following issues are discussed within the advertisement? (Code 1 if present, 0 if
not present)
1. Economic freedom/regulation concerns
2. Religious liberty/freedom of worship
3. Foreign policy
4. Military policy
5. Healthcare
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6.
7.
8.
9.

Gay rights
Reproductive Rights
Women’s Rights
Other________________________

27. What is the dominant issue emphasized in the ad: _________________________
28. If Obamacare/The ACA is mentioned how is it referenced?
0. There is no reference of Obamacare or the ACA
1. The policy is referred to as Obamacare
2. The policy is referred to as the ACA
29. Are fear appeals in the ad?
0. No
1. Yes
30. Are political promises made in the ad?
0. There are no promises made in the ad
1. There are implicit promises in the ad
2. There are explicit promises in the ad
30a. Was the word promise used in the ad?
0. No
1. Yes
30b. What promises were made: _________________________________________

APPENDIX B
CANDIDATE SPONSORED ADVERTISEMENTS
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Mitt Romney
Wrong Choice
Never
Florida Families
Character
History Lesson
Romney Difference
Nevada Families
Rick Santorum
Say What?
Your Side
Rombo
Easy Answer
This Man
Best Chance
Newt Gingrich
Winning the Argument*
Rebuilding the America We Love
Christmas Greeting
$2.50 Plan
Obama Bows Again
We Deserve Solutions
Herman Cain
America Needs Jobs

Ron Paul
Staying on the Right Path
Big Dog
The One
Newt Gingrich: Serial Hypocrisy
He Served
Washington Machine
Principled Leadership
Conviction
Vote Texas
Secure
Rick Perry
A Doer, Not a Talker
Part Time Congress
Leno Ad
Values
American Story
President of Honor
Lazy
Michele Bachmann
Voices Part 2
Waterloo
America’s Iron Lady

All advertisements can be found on the Stanford Political Communications Lab web page.
*The advertisement is misspelled as Wining the Argument on the PCL web page.

APPENDIX C
SUPER PAC ADVERTISEMENTS
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Restore Our Future
Facts
Saved
Whoops
Smiling
Risk
Proud
Desperate
Own Words
Continue to Fail
Right Experience
Winning Our Future
Questionable
Newt On Jobs
Its Time to Choose Newt (30s)
Its Time to Choose Newt (60s)
Think You Know Mitt?
Best Friends
Prosperity

Red, White, and Blue Fund
Trust*
Pride*
The Only One
America’s Future
Vital Decisions
Devoted
Revolution PAC
Plastic Men**
Make Us Great Again
Difference
Job Creation
Keep Conservatives United
KCU-Budget-c4**
Our Destiny
Someone
Quotes
Two

Unless otherwise specified, advertisements can be found on the Stanford Political
Communications Lab web page.
*Advertisements are attributed to candidate, but are produced by Super PACs.
** Advertisements cannot be found on the PCL database, but can be found on YouTube.

APPENDIX D
ADVERTISEMENTS USED FOR INTERCODER RELIABILITY
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Candidate Advertisements
Leno Ad
Rombo
America Needs Jobs
Rebuilding the America We Love
Florida Families
Conviction
America’s Iron Lady
President of Honor
Super PAC Advertisements
Two
Smiling
KCU-Budget-c4
Own Words
Right Experience
Someone

APPENDIX E
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ADS
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Tone of Ad
Candidate Positive
Candidate Negative
Candidate Positive with Negative Elements
Candidate Negative with Positive Elements

Total Ads
28.57%
25.71%
28.57%
17.14%

Super PAC Ads
16.67%
36.67%
30.00%
16.67%

Candidate Ads
37.50%
17.50%
27.50%
17.50%

APPENDIX F
CHRONOLOGICAL BREAKDOWN FOR ADVERTISEMENTS
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Initial Air Date
July-November 2011
December 2011
January 2012
February 2012
March-April 2012

Total Ads
18.57%
31.43%
20.00%
18.57%
11.43%

Super PAC Ads
10.00%
20.00%
33.33%
26.67%
10.00%

Candidate Ads
25.00%
40.00%
10.00%
12.50%
12.50%

